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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)0) 
U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the District Court correct in determining that the language in Midvale's 
sexually oriented business [SOB] ordinance prohibiting the sale of products with a "central 
theme" that depicts or describes sexual activities or specified anatomical areas without a 
sexually oriented business license is not unconstitutionally vague? 
2. Was the District Court correct in determining that the language requiring an 
SOB license for an establishment with the "principal purpose" of selling sexually oriented 
items is not unconstitutionally vague? 
3. Was the District Court correct in determining that the doctrine of prior restraint 
does not apply to the facts before the court because Dr. John's failed to apply for an SOB 
license? 
4. Was the District Court correct in determining that Midvale's SOB ordinance 
is not unconstitutionally overbroad? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND CASES AT ISSUE 
Chapter 5.56 of the Midvale City Code [M.C.C.], entitled: "Sexually Oriented 
Business" is at issue in the appeal. Appellant includes a version of this ordinance with the 
date 9/98 as Addendum "A" of its brief. It is important to note that the ordinance included 
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in the Appellant's brief is not the ordinance at issue on this appeal. Midvale's ordinance was 
amended on August 16, 2000, nine months prior to the proceeding below. In that 
proceeding, counsel for Appellee introduced into evidence Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, which is a 
copy of the amendments made to the ordinance, without objection from opposing counsel. 
See Trial Transcript, Vol. I, page 51, lines 2-5, page 52, lines 1-5.l The amendments 
introduced below are attached hereto as Addendum "A". 
The correct version of the ordinance includes a preamble that states the purposes of 
the ordinance, as well as creates additional time limits on how long a city has to grant or 
deny an SOB license. These additions counter several of the arguments raised by Appellant 
on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 14,2000 Midvale City received an application from defendant, John Haltom, 
for a commercial business license for a commercial establishment known as Doctor John's, 
Inc. See Trial Transcript, page 27, lines 4-13 (the Business License Application is attached 
hereto as Addendum "C"). On this application Mr. Haltom described his business as a 
lingerie, swimwear, rose, novelty and gift shop. Id. On June 15,2000, Ms. Shreeve, business 
license administrator for Midvale City, asked Mr. Haltom for a definition of the novelties 
he intended to sell at his new establishment. Mr. Haltom responded "candles and lotions" 
!A11 portions of the Trial Transcript referenced in this brief are included in 
Addendum B. 
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failing to mention adult videos, adult magazines, and sexual devices. See Trial Transcript, 
Vol. I, page 5, lines 23-25; page 6, lines 1-5. 
On June 28th, 2000, Ms. Shreeve accompanied a Midvale building official on a 
building inspection of Mr. Haltom's store. During this visit Ms. Shreeve saw playing cards 
with nude women, massage oils packaged for sexual purposes, i.e. Mr. Prolong and 
Superglide, and books with specific sexual purposes, i.e. a picture book of Sensual Love. 
See id. at Vol. I, page 28, line 23-25; page 29, line 1. Ms. Shreeve informed Mr. Haltom at 
that time that he would have to apply for a sexually oriented business [SOB] license if he 
intended on selling this type of product, or else remove them from his shelves. See id. at 
Vol. I, page 28, lines 15-25; page 30, lines 1-6. 
As a follow up, Ms. Shreeve wrote a letter to Mr. Haltom on June 28,2000, informing 
him he would have to apply for an SOB license and sent him a copy of Midvale's SOB 
ordinance. See Letter from Susan Shreeve to John Haltom of 6/28/00, attached hereto as 
Addendum "D". She also informed him that his general business license application would 
not be approved until he removed the sexually oriented products or applied for an SOB 
license. Id. 
After several communications on the phone, Mr. Haltom was personally notified by 
the Midvale City Administrator, Midvale Economic Development Director, and Midvale 
City Attorney that he would need to obtain a sexually oriented business license before 
commencing operation of his business. See Trial Transcript, Vol. I, page 7, lines 16-20. 
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Mr. Haltom never applied for an SOB license. See id. at Vol. I, page 16, lines 10-15. 
Further, he never appealed the denial of his general business license as provided in M.C.C. 
§ 5.04.050.2 See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 4 (R. 925). 
On August 8th a temporary restraining order was issued which prohibited Mr. Haltom 
from operating a commercial establishment known as Doctor John's Lingerie and Novelty 
Boutique located at 6885 South State Street, Midvale, Utah. Id. On the date of the temporary 
restraining order the parties appeared by counsel and agreed that if Mr. Haltom removed 
from his shelves those things deemed to be sexually oriented products under the Midvale 
City Code, the City would not take further action. Id. At this time a general business license 
was issued. See Dr. John's Business License of 8/08/00, attached hereto as Addendum "E". 
This agreement was complied with for a period of time, during which Mr. Haltom 
was issued a general business license. However, on October 2, 2000, Ms. Vicki Seigal, 
enforcement officer for Midvale City, entered the store and observed several hundred dildos 
and several hundred vibrators, as well as anal beads and pleasure rings. See Trial Transcript 
Vol. I, page 120, lines 7-25; page 121, lines 1-2. She again entered the store on October 20, 
2Section 5.04.050 reads: 
If the license is denied or approved with qualifications, or if a 
notice of suspension, revocation or citation of a civil fine is 
imposed, the applicant or licensee may file an appeal with the 
business license administrator. 
\\Joni\myfiles\UGT\Haltom\PLEADINGS\repiy brief sup ct corbin wpd 4 
2000 and found the inventory had been increased to approximately five-hundred dildos, 
twenty female genitalia devices, finger vibrators, pleasure rings, anal beads and other 
sexually oriented paraphernalia. Id. at Vol. I, page 121, lines 13-25. On October 24, 2000 
she again observed an increase of inventory to over three hundred genitalia devices and 
several hundred more dildos. Id. at Vol. I, page 125, lines 12-14. Other city officials visited 
the store during early November and observed similar items and quantities, as well as the 
addition of adult videos. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page 6 (R. 927). 
A permanent injunction was subsequently sought for and granted during a bench trial 
before Judge Leslie A. Lewis. See Judgement and Permanent Injunction, Appellant's brief, 
Addendum "D". 
Mr. Haltom has never applied for an SOB license. See Trial Transcript Vol. I, page 
16, lines 10-15. According to M.C.C. § 5.56.040, "it is unlawful for any person to operate 
a sexually oriented business . . . without first obtaining a sexually oriented business license." 
A sexually oriented business is defined as follows: 
[A] commercial establishment . . . [w]hich, as one of its 
principal purposes, offers for sale or rental, for any form of 
consideration, any one or more of the following: books, 
magazines, periodicals or other printed matter, or photographs, 
films, motion pictures, video cassettes or video reproductions, 
slides or other visual representations, the central theme of which 
depicts or describes sexual activities or specified anatomical 
areas; or instruments, devices or paraphernalia which are 
designated for use in connection with specified sexual activities, 
except for legitimate medically recognized contraceptives. 
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M.C.C. §§ 5.56.010. 
The M.C.C. provides the following remedies for violations of § 5.56.040: 
An entity or individual who operates or causes to be operated a 
sexually oriented business, without a valid license . . . or who 
operates such a business or functions as such an employee in 
violation of the provisions in this chapter, is subject to a suit for 
injunction in addition to the civil and criminal violations 
provided in this chapter, and any other remedy available in law 
or in equity. 
M.C.C. § 5.56.330 (emphasis added). 
Dr. John's makes a facial challenge to Midvale's ordinance, arguing that the 
ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and a prior restraint on free expression. 
OPINION BELOW 
The Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis held the following conclusions of law: 
1. Midvale City Code prohibits individuals from operating sexually oriented 
businesses within Midvale City without first obtaining a sexually oriented business license. 
2. Midvale City Code defines a "sexually oriented business" as a commercial 
establishment "[w]hich holds itself out to be such a business" or "which, as one of its 
principal purposes, offers for sale or rental" sexually oriented products. 
3. Dr. John's, Inc., d/b/a Dr. John's Lingerie and Novelty Boutique, holds itself 
out to be a sexually oriented business. 
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4. Based on the nature, quantity and category of products being sold at Dr. 
John's, one of Dr. John's, Inc.'s, d/b/a Dr. John's Lingerie and Novelty Boutique, principal 
purposes is the sale of sexually oriented products. 
5. Dr. John's Lingerie and Novelty Boutique is therefore a "sexually oriented 
business" as defined and contemplated under the Midvale City Code. 
6. Defendants violated M.C.C. § 5.56.040 by operating a sexually oriented 
business within Midvale City without having first obtained a sexually oriented business 
license. 
7. The sale of lingerie and novelties by Dr. John's is unprotected commercial 
speech. 
8. The videos sold by Dr. John's may qualify for marginal protection under the 
First Amendment. 
9. The Midvale City Code's definition of sexually oriented business is not 
unconstitutionally vague as it provides clear and precise notice and a clear indication to 
anybody reading it of precisely what type of conduct is prohibited without first obtaining a 
sexually oriented business license. 
10. The licensing requirements for sexually oriented businesses contained in the 
Midvale City Code are not unconstitutionally overbroad. 
11. The licensing requirements for sexually oriented businesses contained in the 
Midvale City Code do not constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. 
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12. As the Defendant failed to apply for a sexually oriented business license before 
engaging in its business operation, the prior restraint doctrine is not applicable to his case. 
13. Further, since the Midvale City ordinance is aimed at preventing unfavorable 
secondary effects rather than the dissemination of expression, the prior restraint doctrine is 
inapplicable to this case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court was correct in determining that Midvale's SOB ordinance is not 
vague, overbroad, or a prior restraint on speech. 
More specifically, the District Court was correct in determining that the sale of 
sexually oriented products is only marginally protected under the First Amendment and that 
the middle-tier scrutiny established in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) applies. 
However, Appellee renews its arguments that the lower level of scrutiny afforded 
commercial speech, established in Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 
489, 497 (1981), also provides a secondary ground upon which the court could uphold the 
ordinance. This argument is based on testimony from Mr. John R. Coil, Chief Financial 
Officer of Dr. John's, stating that Dr. John's has no expressive intent with the sexual items 
it sells beyond simply selling a product. Because Dr. John's concedes that it has no intent 
at any expression, there is nothing for the First Amendment to protect, and the protection 
afforded purely commercial speech applies. 
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The District Court was correct in determining that Midvale's ordinance is a 
constitutional content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction under O 'Brien: case law 
establishes that it is within the constitutional power of the Government to pass such an 
ordinance; the ordinance furthers the important or substantial governmental interest of 
controlling the negative secondary effects (i.e. increased crime, loss of property value, etc.) 
associated with SOBs; the ordinance is content-neutral because its purpose is to only regulate 
the negative secondary effects of SOBs and is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and requiring a business to apply and obtain an SOB license to operate is only 
an incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms that is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest. 
Dr. John's claim that Midvale has failed to show evidence of its legislative record that 
establishes what studies it looked at to justify its concerns over negative secondary effects 
was not properly preserved below and should not be considered in this appeal. The 
argument was raised for the first time in closing arguments, after the close of evidence, when 
it was impossible for Midvale to adequately respond. The District Court did not rule on the 
issue, and Dr. John's failed to object, further precluding its claim. Further, had the issue 
been properly raised Midvale could have easily met its evidentiary burden through the 
ordinance's preamble that clearly states the ordinance's purpose, as well as presenting the 
court with analogous case law relied on to draft the ordinance and evidence of the personal 
experience of the City Council members, all of which have been recognized as reasonable 
\\Joni\myfiles\UGT\Haltom\PLEADINGS\reply bnef.sup ct.corbin.wpd ^ 
evidence under Kenton evidentiary standards. See generally Kenton v. Playtime Theaters, 
Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
The District Court was correct in determining that the ordinance is not overbroad. 
Items with the "central theme" of depicting sexual activities, and a business with the 
"primary purpose" of selling such items is clear to a person of common intelligence. 
Further, Dr. John's vagueness claim is limited because he was repeatedly put on notice that 
he was in violation of the ordinance, and also because the type and number of items he sold 
(hundreds of dildos, pocket pussies, anal beads, and cock rings) were at the center of what 
the ordinance is drafted to cover where no vagueness can be claimed. 
The District Court was correct in determining that the doctrine of prior restraint does 
not apply to the facts at hand because Dr. John's never applied for an SOB license. Further, 
even if the doctrine did apply, Midvale's ordinance meets the procedural requirements to be 
upheld as constitutional. First, it does not grant one authority "unbridled discretion" to deny 
a license, but contains a detailed and prompt appeal process that has two levels of appeal. 
Second, the ordinance provides for prompt judicial review of any denial, requiring that the 
city grant or deny a license within forty-five days of filing. This time period has been upheld 
in other jurisdictions as reasonable. Finally, Dr. John's argument that Midvale's ordinance 
fails to leave open adequate alternative avenues of communication is not applicable to the 
case at hand. This analysis is used in cases where cities include zoning restrictions on where 
SOBs can locate (i.e. not within one thousand feet of a church or school, etc.). It requires 
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a city to show that there are areas available notwithstanding the zoning, where an SOB can 
be established. Midvale's ordinance does not contain any such zoning restriction and 
therefore the adequate alternative avenues of communication does not apply. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly established that injunctive relief is an appropriate 
remedy against businesses that are operating without an appropriate business license. See 
Ogden City v. Eagle Books, Inc. 586 P.2d 436 (Utah 1978). 
Dr. John's arguments that it has a right of privacy to sell sexual novelties items, and 
that this right should allow it to operate without a business license is misplaced. Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the principal case cited as support, established that 
laws could not be upheld criminalizing the use of contraceptives in the marital home. The 
court extended this right to include banning laws that would criminalize businesses that 
wanted to sell medically recognized contraceptives as well. The case did not establish that 
those businesses therefore had the right to sell contraceptives without an appropriate 
business license, nor did it extend this privacy right to the sale of sexual novelty items. 
Finally, Dr. John's state constitutional claims should be dismissed for a failure to 
adequately raise or brief "different analysis" upon which a decision by this court could be 
made. Dr. John's includes at the end of its forty-four page brief a suggestion that it "may 
have" additional protection under Article I Section 15 of the Utah Constitution. Dr. John's 
cites one Utah case and two cases from other jurisdictions that are not applicable to the case 
at hand as support. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994), establishes the 
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extensive nature of briefing required to raise a claim under the Utah Constitution (i.e., 
extensive state case law analysis, the text of the constitutional provision, and a thorough 
historical analysis of the intent of the drafters of the Utah Constitution). Further, Dr. John's 
must also provide the Court with different analysis than that done under Federal Law. Dr. 
John's has failed to meet these standards. It's state constitutional claim is included as an 
afterthought and should not be considered. Further, it would not be in keeping with this 
court's jurisprudence, nor the intent of the constitutional drafters to extend additional 
protection to the sale of sexual novelty items than that required by the First Amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT 
THE SALE OF SEXUALLY ORIENTED PRODUCTS IS ONLY 
MARGINALLY PROTECTED UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The first question before the Court is to determine if the conduct of selling sexually 
oriented products is afforded First Amendment protection. The District Court held that the 
sale of novelty items is unprotected commercial speech which falls beyond the ambit of First 
Amendment protection. See Memorandum Decision, page 3 (R. 912) {citing Hoffman 
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1981)). However, the court 
recognized that the sale of erotic videos may qualify for marginal protection under the First 
Amendment. See id. Rather than analyze the products at issue on an individual basis the 
court gave Dr. John's the benefit of the doubt and concluded that the sale of sexual novelty 
items qualifies for First Amendment protection. See id. at page 4 (R.913). 
l? 
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Appellee renews its argument below that the facts of this case clearly establish Dr. 
John's is only engaged in the purely commercial exploitation of sexually oriented products, 
with no intent to express any message beyond merely making a sale. Therefore, there is no 
speech interest at issue and Dr. John's conduct does not qualify for First Amendment 
protection. 
In Hoffman, the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance that required a special license 
in order to sell "any items, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or thing" related to illegal 
cannabis or drugs. 455 U.S. at 492. The Flipside, a store that sold this type of product, 
argued that the ordinance was vague, and also overbroad because it restricted the sale of 
these items, the designs and logos of which it claimed were protected First Amendment 
expression. See generally id. 
The court held that in a facial challenge "a court's first task is to determine whether 
the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Id. at 
494-495 (emphasis added). The court held that the designs and logos on the products sold 
did not qualify as expression under the First Amendment, and that simply selling a product 
without any expressive intent is commercial speech, thus falling beyond the ambit of First 
Amendment protection. See id. 
In a like manner, Dr. John's has no expressive intent in the novelty items or videos 
that it sells. This was clearly established in the testimony of Mr. John R. Coil, Chief 
Financial Officer of Dr. John's, who stated during the bench trial that Dr. John's has no 
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expressive intent through any of its products beyond simply making a sale. Mr. Coil testified 
that, "Our purpose in buying this stuff is to sell it, and when it goes out the door we could 
care less, it's irrelevant. We bring it in, we sell it, end of purpose." Trial Transcript Volume 
II, page 351, lines 8-23. 
By conceding this crucial point, Mr. Coil established that there is no speech interest 
to protect. Like Flipside in Hoffman, Dr. John's is simply engaged in the commercial 
exploitation of sexually oriented products, which is clearly outside of the circumference of 
the First Amendment. There is no untrammeled political debate going on. There is no erotic 
message being communicated. In the eyes of Dr. John's there is simply no communication 
taking place. By its own testimony it clearly established that it brings products in and sells 
them, end of purpose. This is the perfect definition of commercial speech. 
Therefore, Midvale renews the argument that Hoffman is controlling, and that it 
affords this Court a secondary ground upon which it could uphold the ordinance. See 
generally Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231,241 (Utah 1993) (The reviewing court 
may also affirm on any ground available to the trial court regardless of whether it was relied 
upon in reaching the decision from which an appeal is sought). 
Relying on Hoffman would allow the Court to apply the lowest level of scrutiny 
available to it. In situations where the conduct being regulated has no communicative 
intent, the standard is as follows: 
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In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, 
a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment 
reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail. 
The court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge, 
and assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally 
protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the 
enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. 
Id. at 494-495. The standard in Hoffman makes Dr. John's overbreadth claim moot, and 
requires him to show that the Midvale ordinance is unconstitutionally vague in all of its 
applications. The statute clearly passes constitutional muster under this analysis. Midvale 
raises this claim only as a secondary basis to its main arguments that the District Court 
correctly applied the middle-tier level of scrutiny established in O 'Brien. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT MID VALE'S 
SOB ORDINANCE IS SUBJECT TO MIDDLE-TIER SCRUTINY 
If the court determines that the sale of sexually oriented products qualifies for First 
Amendment protection, the next question that must be resolved is what level of protection 
it should be afforded. The District Court was correct in rejecting Dr. John's argument that 
the sale of sexually oriented products is "clearly protected First Amendment expressive 
activity" subject to strict scrutiny,3 and instead recognizing that sexually oriented businesses 
3The United States Supreme Court has created three levels of scrutiny when 
dealing with a First Amendment facial challenge to an ordinance on the grounds that the 
ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, or a prior restraint. In deciding which 
level of scrutiny applies, the first question is whether the ordinance is aimed at the 
repression of expression. See Johnson v. Texas, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (where a statute 
making it a crime to burn the American flag was stricken down as a repression of 
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enjoy only marginal protection under the First Amendment with respect to the materials that 
they sell, making Mid vale's ordinance subject to the middle-tier scrutiny established in U.S. 
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See Memorandum Decision, pages 4-5 (R. 913-914). 
It is well established that the sale of sexually oriented items is granted only marginal 
First Amendment protection. Such expression has consistently been subordinated and given 
considerably less protection than such recognized core First Amendment areas as political, 
social, and religious expressions. In Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., All U.S. 50 
(1976) (plurality opinion) (where two adult theaters challenged an ordinance that required 
a special license to operate an adult business and restricted adult theaters from locating 
within 1000 feet of another adult theater), the court stated, "There is surely less vital interest 
in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between pornography and 
artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance." 
Id. at 61. Stating further, 
Moreover, even though we recognize that the First Amendment 
will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that 
have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society's 
interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly 
expression). If an ordinance is aimed at the suppression of content it is considered 
content-based and "presumptively violates the First Amendment." Simon & Schuster, 
Inc. v. Members ofN.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.9 502 U.S. 105, (1991) (where a New 
York Statute that prohibited criminals from selling their stories for money was stricken 
down). A content-based interest is unconstitutional unless "necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Perry Educ. 
Adsss'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S 37, 45 (1983). 
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different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled 
political debate that inspired Voltaire's immortal comment4. .. 
. But few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war 
to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual 
Activities" exhibited in the theaters of our choice. Even though 
the First Amendment protects communication in this area from 
total suppression, we hold that the State may legitimately use 
the content of these materials as the basis for placing them in a 
different classification from other motion pictures. 
See id. at 70-71. The court concluded "The mere fact that the commercial exploitation of 
material protected by the First Amendment is subject to zoning and other licensing 
requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating these ordinances." Id. at 62. 
The subordination of sexually oriented expression was upheld in Renton v. Playtime 
Theaters, Inc., 415 U.S. 41,49 n.2 (1986) (quoting Young, All U.S. 70-71); and again more 
recently in City of Erie v. PAP's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 281 (2000) (a case describing public 
nude dancing as expressive conduct, held that"... we think that it falls only within the outer 
ambit of the First Amendment's protection."). 
In determining that the sale of sexually oriented products is afforded only marginal 
protection under the First Amendment, the District Court then correctly rejected Dr. John's 
argument that strict scrutiny applies, and applied the middle-tier level of review. The case 
law is abundant to support the appropriateness of this level of scrutiny to SOB ordinances.5 
4I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it. 
5See generally Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, (1986); Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc. All U.S. 50 (1976); TK'S Video, Inc. v. Denton County, 
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Therefore, the District Court should be upheld in determining that the sale of sexually 
oriented items is only marginally protected under the First Amendment and that middle-tier 
standards applicable to "content-neutral time, place, and manner" regulations apply. 
in . MID VALE'S ORDINANCE IS A VALID "TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER55 
REGULATION THAT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID UNDER THE 
O'BRIEN TEST 
The District Court was correct in applying the middle-tier standard of review 
established in O 'Brien, and determining that Midvale's SOB ordinance is a constitutionally 
valid content-neutral "time, place and manner" restriction. 
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed that municipalities, in the interest of 
preventing negative secondary effects (such as crime and conduct harmful to public health, 
safety and welfare, etc.), may regulate SOBs through content-neutral licensing ordinances. 
See generally Kenton, 475 U.S at 47 (where the court held an SOB ordinance that restricted 
adult theaters to 1000 feet of residential homes, parks, or schools to be a form of time, place, 
and manner regulation). The Kenton court stated, "On the other hand, so-called "content-
neutral" time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to 
serve a substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues 
of communication." Id. 
Tex., 24 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 1994); City of Colorado Springs v. Baby Dolls, 896 P.2d 272 
(Co. 1995); The People v. Library One, 229 Cal. App. 3d 973 (1991); City of National 
City v. Steven D. Weiner, 838 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1992). 
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Midvale's ordinance qualifies as a content-neutral licensing statute. United States v. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S 367 (1968)6 provides the framework for distinguishing whether an 
ordinance operates to repress the content of certain speech, or whether its aim is to diminish 
the negative secondary effects that accompany certain expression with no interest in 
suppressing the content of the message conveyed. O 'Brien sets out the following four-prong 
test: 
Government regulation is sufficiently justified if: 
1) it is within the constitutional power of the Government; 
2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; 
3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and 
4) if the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment 
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance 
of that interest. 
Id. at 377. 
Midvale's SOB ordinance is a constitutionally valid content-neutral licensing statute 
and should be upheld under the requirements set forth in O'Brien. First, concerning the 
6In O'Brien, the defendant challenged a statute that criminalized the burning of a 
draft card by walking onto the local courthouse steps and burning his in political protest 
of the Vietnam war. The court upheld the statute as a valid content neutral time, place 
and manner restriction because the statute was not aimed at repressing the political 
expression, but only aimed at controlling the negative secondary effects of a disorderly 
draft. 
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requirement that the government have constitutional power to pass the ordinance, "[T]here 
is no constitutional impediment to the concept of requiring sexually oriented businesses to 
obtain licenses and pay reasonable fees." Dumas v. City of Dallas, 648 F.Supp. 1061, 1073 
(N.D.Tex. 1986). 
Second, under the prong requiring the ordinance to further a substantial or important 
governmental interest, the ordinance's preamble states the following important governmental 
interests: 
This section shall be construed consistent with the governmental 
interest of the City in protecting its citizens from increased 
crime in the preservation of its quality of life and property 
values and the character of the City's neighborhoods and 
businesses; and to deter the spread of urban blight and to protect 
against the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. 
M.C.C. § 5.56.000. Protection against the secondary effects of SOB's, "such as impacts on 
public health, safety, and welfare," has been recognized as a legitimate governmental 
interest. See Kenton, 475 U.S. at 47-48. 
Next, under the third prong, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression because it focuses only on protecting Midvale from the secondary effects 
of SOBs (i.e. increased crime, decreasing property values, etc.), and is not written in any way 
to censor what is being sold. The United States Supreme Court has recognized similar 
ordinances seeking to protect against similar secondary effects as being unrelated to the 
suppression of speech. See, PAPS, 529 U.S at 291 (quoting Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 
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501 U.S., 560,585 (1991)) ("on its face, the governmental interest in combating prostitution 
and other criminal activity [associated with SOBs] is not at all inherently related to 
expression.") 
Put another way, the ordinance does not attempt to regulate the primary effects of the 
expression, e.g. what is being sold, or what is being done with what is being sold, but rather 
the secondary effects of SOBs on the community generally, such as the impacts on public 
health, safety, and welfare. The ordinance itself does not restrict expression in any way. It 
simply requires that a license be obtained in an effort to control the secondary effects of such 
a business on the neighborhood. Since it is the secondary effects of SOBs that are being 
regulated, and not the content of any intended expression, the third prong is met. 
Finally, there is no incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms. Midvale's 
ordinance does not limit Dr. John's ability to sell its product. All that Midvale requires is 
that he apply and receive a sexually oriented business license. The ordinance does not limit 
the number of SOBs that may locate in Midvale; does not contain zoning requirements on 
where an SOB may locate; or place restrictions on the type or quantity of product SOBs want 
to sell. All the ordinance requires is that a business simply apply for a license, which is not 
a restriction on speech. 
Further, even if obtaining an SOB license could be viewed as an incidental restraint, 
it is de minimus and not sufficient to render the ordinance as content based. See id. 529 U.S. 
at 294 ("If states are to be able to regulate secondary effects, then de minimus intrusions on 
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expression such as those at issue here [requiring pasties and g-stings] cannot be sufficient 
to render the ordinance content based.") (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989)). The District Court correctly held, "Moreover, the ordinance's effect is mitigated 
and is de minimus in its impact on expression, because it permits the sale of sexually 
oriented products upon proper application and licensure." Memorandum Decision, page 6 
(R. 915). 
Midvale's ordinance satisfies the four part test set forth in O'Brien and therefore 
qualifies as a content-neutral licensing statute that should be upheld. 
A. Dr. John's claims that the City of Midvale has failed to present its 
legislative record showing it did adequate study to establish the negative 
secondary effects of SOBs was not raised nor ruled on below and should 
not be considered by this Court 
In point four of Dr. John's brief it argues that Midvale has the burden of proof of 
showing that its SOB ordinance is related in some substantial way to controlling the negative 
secondary effects that it recites as its justification for the ordinance. This argument fails for 
two reasons. 
First, the argument was not adequately raised below and was therefore not preserved 
for appeal. "To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely bring the issue 
to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an opportunity to rule on the issue's 
merits." See Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667,672 (Utah 
11 
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1982); see also James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799,801 -02 (Utah App. 1987). "Issues not raised 
in the trial court in a timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding [the appellate court] from 
considering their merits on appeal." Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah 
App.1989); accord Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984); 
Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). 
Not only was it not raised below, but it wasn't mentioned in the pleadings. However, 
even if it was, the mere mention of an issue in the pleadings, when no supporting evidence 
or relevant legal authority is introduced at trial in support of the claim, is insufficient to raise 
an issue at trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. See generally James, 
746 P.2d at 801. This rule is "stringently applied when the new theory depends on 
controverted factual questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at trial." Id. 
(quoting Bogacki v. Board of Supervisors, 489 P.2d 537, 543-44, (1971), cert, denied, 405 
U.S. 1030, 92 S.Ct. 1301, 31 L.Ed.2d 488 (1972)). 
Dr. John's did not timely raise its claim that the city had the burden to present 
evidence of the studies it relied on. The first time the claim was even mentioned was during 
closing arguments. The issue was not raised in Dr. John's answer and cross-claim, was not 
briefed in its trial memorandum, was not mentioned in Dr. John's opening statement, and 
no questions were asked of any witness eliciting evidence that the negative secondary effects 
claimed by the city were fraudulent. In its closing Dr. John's argued for the first time that 
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the city had the burden of presenting its legislative record to show what it based its belief of 
negative secondary effects on. In response to this argument counsel for the Appellee stated, 
MR. HATHAWAY: "I believe that counsel argued unless the 
concern is raised that for whatever reason the conclusion is 
reached by the legislative body or not to support (inaudible). 
That hasn't been challenged here. Nobody has argued, "You're 
wrong, there's no common in crime increase, there's no blight 
in the neighborhood, there's no sexually transmitted disease." 
THE COURT: "So there's no need to rebut, then." 
See Trial Transcript Vol. II, page 394, lines 24-25, page 395, lines 1-6. 
The District Court did not address the argument in its memorandum decision nor in 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, showing that the issue had not been raised to the 
"level of consciousness" necessary for the judge to consider it. See generally James, 746 
P.2d at 802. Further, Dr. John's failed to object to the omission of a ruling on this claim 
below, further precluding its claim. In James the court held that a failure to object to a 
failure to make a ruling waives the claim because the objection is necessary to bring the 
potential mistake to the "level of consciousness" necessary for the judge to consider it. Id. 
("Further, James made no objection to the trial court's failure to rule on the issue . . . The 
trial court made no ruling as to the existence of an equitable mortgage and James made no 
objection to this omission."). 
Dr. John's attempt to raise this claim in its closing below, and now again on appeal 
is subterfuge designed to limit the City's ability to present evidence necessary to respond. 
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Dr. John's raised this argument only after the close of all evidence, when it was obvious that 
the City would have no opportunity to provide rebuttal evidence. The District Court did not 
address the claim because it simply was not an issue placed before it. 
However, even if the claim were properly preserved, Dr. John's misstates the 
evidentiary requirements of Renton, and the City's burden to show what studies it relied on 
in passing the ordinance. Dr. John's argues that evidence of legislative intent is required 
to justify Renton-type restrictions, while ignoring the fact that the Supreme Court has 
recognized language in an ordinances preamble that states the purposes of the ordinance is 
as sufficient to meet Renton 's requirements. 
In Young the Supreme Court discussed the preamble of an ordinance similar to that 
contained in Midvale's,7 noting that "on the basis of the reasons stated by the city for 
adopting the ordinances, the court concluded that they represented a rational attempt to 
preserve the city's neighborhood." 427 U.S. at 55-56. In a footnote the Supreme Court 
7M.C.C. § 5.56.00, entitled "Purpose of Section," states: 
It is the purpose and object of this section that the City 
establish reasonable and uniform regulations governing the 
time, place, and manner of operation of sexually oriented 
businesses and their employees in the City. This Section 
shall be construed consistent with the government interests of 
the City in protecting its citizens from increased crime in the 
preservation of its quality of life and property values and the 
character of the City's neighborhoods and businesses; and to 
deter the spread of urban blight and to protect against the 
spread of sexually transmitted diseases. 
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quoted the District Court, stating: "[w]hen, as here, the City has stated a reason for adopting 
an ordinance which is a subject of legitimate concern, that statement of purpose is not subject 
to attack." id. at 56, n. 11. 
In PAPS, the Court held, "And in terms of demonstrating that such secondary effects 
pose a threat, the city need not "conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that 
already generated by other cities" to demonstrate the problem of secondary effects, "so long 
as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem 
that the city addresses." 529 U.S. at 296 {citing Kenton 475 U.S. at 51-52). 
Further, the PAPS court established that "The city council members, familiar with 
commercial downtown Erie, are the individuals who would likely have had firsthand 
knowledge of what took place at and around nude dancing establishments in Erie, and can 
make particularized, expert judgements about the resulting harmful secondary effects." Id. 
at 297-298 (emphasis added). The court continued, 
Here, Kandyland has had ample opportunity to contest the 
council's finding about secondary effects - before the council 
itself, through the state proceedings, and before this Court. Yet 
to this day, Kandyland has never challenged the city council's 
findings or cast any specific doubt on the validity of those 
findings. Instead, it has simply asserted that the council's 
evidentiary proof was lacking. In the absence of any reason to 
doubt it, the city's expert judgement should be credited. 
Id. at 298. Relying on city council members as experts was followed in Thames 
Entertainment, Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 851 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1988), where the court held 
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that it is sufficient for a legislator to rely on his "personal experience [that] adult 
establishments tended to attract transients and that their location in a neighborhood was not 
conducive to neighborhood revitalization . . . Personal observations of a legislator . . . 
certainly fall within the category of experience that can be properly considered by a 
legislative body in enacting an ordinance [and] qualify as the evidence recognized in 
Renton." Id. at 201-202. 
Also, in PAPS, the Supreme Court established that a city can rely on past case law as 
evidence of the potential for negative secondary effects, 
Because the nude dancing at Kandyland is of the same character 
as the adult entertainment at issue in Renton, Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and 
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), it was reasonable for 
Erie to conclude that such nude dancing was likely to produce 
the same secondary effects. And Erie could reasonably rely on 
the evidentiary foundation set forth in Renton and American 
Mini Theatres to the effect that secondary effects are caused by 
the presence of even one adult entertainment establishment in 
a given neighborhood. 
529 U.S. at 296-297. The court concluded ". . . the evidentiary standard described in 
Renton controls here, and Erie meets that standard." Id. 
Had this claim been properly raised, briefed, and argued by Dr. John's, the City could 
have easily demonstrated through the ordinance's preamble, case law relied on to draft the 
ordinance, and the expert judgement of the city council members that the negative secondary 
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effects mentioned in the preamble are legitimate. Since Dr. John's has failed to 
substantially challenge the City's findings, the judgement of the City should be upheld. 
Dr. John's cites Tollis v. San Bernadino County, 827 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1987) as 
support for the proposition that a city must demonstrate what studies it relied on in justifying 
the regulation. This case is distinct because the ordinance at issue in Tollis did not contain 
a preamble that clearly stated the purpose of the ordinance, which would have subjected the 
analysis to the conclusion of the Supreme Court's decision in Young ("[w]hen, as here, the 
City has stated a reason for adopting an ordinance which is a subject of legitimate concern, 
that statement of purpose is not subject to attack.") Id. at 56, n. 11. The court was therefore 
left to guess at what the purpose of the ordinance was, and since no evidence was offered by 
the city, the statute was struck down. Midvale has not been so careless. The ordinance's 
preamble clearly states its purpose, and the City's reasons are therefore subject to the 
protection of Young, 
Dr. John's also cites SDJ, Inc. v. City ofHoustonf 837 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1988), cert, 
denied, 489 U.S. 1052 (1989) (where the court considered whether a city looked at studies 
that specifically cited the secondary effects of topless bars, determining that a study done 
several years prior to the passage of the ordinance was sufficient to meet Kenton evidentiary 
requirements) as support for the same principle. Once again, the case did not deal with an 
ordinance that contained a preamble wherein the purposes were clearly stated. 
\Uom\myfiles\UGT\Hakom\PLEADINGS\reply brief sup ct corbin vvpd 28 
MDI1Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 935 F.Supp. 1384 (N.D.Tex. 1995) is also 
inapplicable to the case at bar. No claims have been made that Midvale sought to justify its 
ordinance based on a study performed after the passage of the ordinance. To the contrary, 
had evidence been presented on this issue it would have shown what cases the city attorneys 
relied on in drafting the ordinance. 
The preamble of the ordinance is sufficient evidence under Young to establish the 
reasonable purposes of Midvale. Further, since the Dr. John's has failed to substantially 
challenge the findings of the City in any material way, the judgement of the city council 
members should be held as sufficient for Kenton purposes. Therefore, even if the issue were 
properly preserved below, Midvale's ordinance still passes constitutional muster and should 
be upheld. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT 
MID VALE'S SOB ORDINANCE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
Dr. John's argues that two aspects of the Midvale City Ordinance are 
unconstitutionally vague: 1) the prohibition of the sale of items that have the "central theme" 
of depicting or describing sexual activities or specified anatomical areas; and 2) the 
requirement to obtain an SOB license if the business has as "one of its principal purposes" 
the sale of sexually oriented products. Dr. John's claims that it is impossible to tell what 
the central theme of a book, picture, or film is, thus leaving total discretion to the reviewing 
officer to decide how the ordinance will be interpreted. Dr. John's further argues that the 
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"principal purpose" standard is nebulas and does not put a business owner on notice of how 
many of these items he can sale before it becomes a "principle purpose" of the establishment. 
Both arguments are mere stratagem with the intent of covering over two key facts that 
bar Mr. Haltom's claim: 1) he was put on notice that he was in violation of the statute, see 
Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 499 ("[The United States Supreme Court] has recognized that a 
scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy 
of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed."); and 2) the type and amount of 
items he was selling were at the hard core of the statute, see id. at 494-495 (Where a person 
"engages in some conduct that is clearly prescribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the 
law as applied to the conduct of others.") 
The record below establishes that Mr. Haltom was put on notice that he was in 
violation of the ordinance, {see Addendum "C"), and that the items he sold (i.e. The Picture 
Book of Sensual Love, hundreds of dildos and "pocket pussies," anal beads and cock rings) 
were not on the periphery of the ordinance, but at its core. See Trial Transcript, page 120, 
lines 7-25. The District Court was correct in determining that ordinance is not vague. 
"The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires that the legislation 
prohibiting particular conduct contain language that provides fair notice and warning and 
sets reasonably clear guidelines for those enforcing and adjudicating under the legislation." 
Dodger's Bar & Grill, Inc. v. Johnson County Bd. Of County Comm frs, 32 F.3d 1436, 1443 
(10th Cir. 1994) (where a bar unsuccessfully brought an action challenging the language 
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"performing acts of or acts which constitute or simulate: the touching caressing or fondling 
of the breast [or] buttocks" as vague); citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73, 94 
S.Ct. 1242,1246-47,39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). The prohibitions must be "set out in terms that 
the ordinary common person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand 
and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest." United States Civil Serv. Comm 'n 
v. National Ass n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,579,93 S.Ct. 2880,2897,37 L.Ed.2d 796 
(1973) (where a statute prohibiting participation in "political activity" was held to be vague 
and overbroad). 
With an emphasis on common sense, the United States Supreme Court has also 
recognized that "we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language." Grayned 
v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (where the language "tends to disturb" in an 
antinoise statute was upheld against a vagueness claim). Also, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 
413 U.S. 601 (1972) (where language such as "partisan," "takes part in," or "affairs o f were 
unsuccessfully challenged as vague) the United States Supreme Court stated, 
Words inevitably contain germs of uncertainty . . . there may be 
disputes over the meaning of such terms in § 818 as "partisan," 
or "takes part in," or "affairs o f political parties. But what was 
said in Letter Carriers, ante, at 578-579, is applicable here: 
"there are limitations in the English language with respect to 
being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us 
that although the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on 
finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the 
ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can 
sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the 
public interest." Moreover, even if the outermost boundaries of 
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§ 818 may be imprecise, any such uncertainty has little 
relevance here, where appellants' conduct falls squarely within 
the "hard core" of the statute's proscriptions and appellants 
concede as much, [citations omitted] 
Id. at 608 (emphasis added). The court stated further that 
It is significant in this respect to note that § 818 does not create 
a "regulatory maze" where those uncertain may become 
hopelessly lost, (citations omitted) Rather, the State Personnel 
Board is available to rule in advance on the permissibility of 
particular conduct under the explicit standards set out in and 
under §818. 
Id. Broadrick places further restrictions on a vagueness review in two ways: 1) Dr. John's 
cannot claim the ordinance is vague if the product he was selling unquestionably had a 
"central theme" that depicts or describes sexual activities or specified anatomical areas, or 
if the number of items he sold that had this central theme was so pervasive that there was no 
question it was a principle purpose of the business; and 2) since the ordinance allows for an 
appeal of any denial of a license application or grievance, Mr. Haltom cannot claim that the 
ordinance is vague without first appealing the meaning to the appropriate review board, 
which he never did. 
Further, in contrast to Dr. John's claim that strict scrutiny applies to a claim of 
vagueness in the area of the first amendment, Hoffman establishes, "Economic regulation 
is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow, and 
because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be 
expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action." See Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 498. 
X) 
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Beyond these limitations, the Grayned court, established the following principles of 
vagueness review: 
1) "When faced with a vague statute . . . [the court] must 'extrapolate its 
allowable meaning,'" and that in doing so it would consider: 
A) the words of the ordinance itself; 
B) the interpretation given by the court below to analogous statutes; and 
C) perhaps to some degree, to the interpretation given by those charged 
with enforcing it. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110. 
2) The words of the ordinance can be marked by "flexibility and reasonable 
breadth, rather than meticulous specificity," as long as it is clear what the 
ordinance as a whole prohibits. Id. (citing Esteban v. Central Missouri State 
College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (CA8 1969) Blackmun, J. Cert. Denied, 398 
U.S. 965 (1970)) 
3) The ordinance should be viewed in the "particular context" for which it was 
written, and adequate notice should be viewed through the eyes of "those to 
whom [it] is directed." Id. (citing American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 
399 U.S. at 412.) 
The language challenged by petitioner is not vague under the standards discussed 
above. The standards will be applied to Dr. John's two vagueness challenges in turn. 
A. The District Court was correct in determining that items with the 
"central theme" of depicting or describing sexual activities or specified 
anatomical areas is sufficiently clear to give a man of common intelligence 
notice of what is not allowed 
Dr. John's claim that a prohibition of the sale of items with the "central theme" of 
depicting or describing sexual activities or specified anatomical areas is vague ignores case 
law and common sense. 
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First, the United States Supreme Court has upheld similar language to the "central 
theme" language contained in the Midvale ordinance. In Young v. American Mini Theaters, 
All U.S. 50 (1976) (where an adult theater unsuccessfully argued that language requiring 
a license to show movies "characterized by an emphasis" on "specified sexual activities or 
specified anatomical areas" was vague), the court stated, 
As already noted, the only vagueness in the ordinance relates to 
the amount of sexually explicit activity that may be portrayed 
before the material can be said to be "characterized by an 
emphasis" on such matter. For most films the question will be 
readily answerable; to the extent that an area of doubt exists, we 
see no reason why the ordinances are not "readily subject to a 
narrowing construction by the state courts." 
Id. at 61. As stated in Young, in most cases, what Midvale's ordinance covers will be 
"readily answerable" (i.e. hundreds of dildos and pocket pussies). In areas where there 
might be dispute the ordinance is readily subject to a narrowing construction of the 
administrative body as provided for in the ordinance (which was never appealed to due to 
the fact that Dr. John's never applied for an SOB license). 
A video or card with a "central theme" of depicting or describing sexual activities 
or specified anatomical areas, is sufficiently clear to put a person with common sense on 
notice of what is and is not allowed, especially in the "particular context" of putting John 
Haltom on notice who has owned nine other SOBs in different states, {see Trial Transcript, 
Vol. II, page 239, line 17-20), and who was informed in writing that he needed to get an 
SOB license or remove items from his shelves. See Addendum "C". 
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Further, when read with the entirety of the statute, the challenged language cannot be 
said to be vague. The words of the ordinance can be marked by "flexibility and reasonable 
breadth, rather than meticulous specificity," as long as it is clear what the ordinance as a 
whole prohibits. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110. 
The ordinance states that the sale of such items must be a principal purpose of the 
business, and therefore the "central theme" standard will be applied to classes of items, 
where it will be extremely clear (as the case here) that the establishment is an SOB. This 
interpretation is supported by testimony given by Susan Shreeve, Midvale City's business 
license administrator, wherein she stated that it was not the existence of one sexually 
oriented item that made the ordinance applicable, but the existence of different items being 
sold together that made the ordinance apply. See Trial Transcript page 74, lines 6-12. Dr. 
John's misrepresents the proceeding below throughout its brief by stating that the ordinance 
as a whole "prohibits the sale of one deck of nude playing cards" and that it is impossible 
to determine what articles are prohibited under the statute and what are not. This argument 
ignores the additional restriction of the principal purpose language of the ordinance. 
Further, Dr. John's argument that Susan Shreeve has total discretion to determine how 
the ordinance will be applied, justifying its failure to apply for a license on the claim that her 
interpretation of the statute is that not even one sexual item can be sold, is not supported by 
the facts. This argument ignores the ordinance's provisions for appeal and the simple fact 
that Dr. John's never used them because he never applied for an SOB license. 
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Therefore, when viewed in conjunction with the further limitation of the principal 
purpose language, the central theme standard is not vague, and what the ordinance prohibits 
is clear. 
Third, Hoffman establishes two further hurdles to a vagueness claim that are mortal 
to Dr. John's claim. First, the statute should not be stricken down if an administrative 
process is in place that could clarify its meaning ("Indeed, the regulated enterprise may have 
the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry, or by resort to an 
administrative process.") See Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 499. Midvale's ordinance has in place 
section 5.04.050 which reads: 
If the license is denied or approved with qualifications, or if a 
notice of suspension, revocation or citation of a civil fine is 
imposed, the applicant or licensee may file an appeal with the 
business license administrator. 
Id. Dr. John's never applied for a sexually oriented business license, and never appealed 
Midvale's initial denial of the general business license, thus limiting its power to raise a 
vagueness claim. 
Further, the complainant should not be allowed to claim vagueness where notice was 
adequate that he was in violation of the ordinance. The United States Supreme Court uhas 
recognized that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with 
respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed." 
Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 499. The record is replete with evidence that from the very first 
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inspection Dr. John's was informed that it was in violation of the statute. See Trial 
Transcript page 30, lines 2-15, page 37, lines 10-20,page 42, lines3-14. It should therefore 
be barred from arguing that the statute is vague because it knew Midvale considered the 
novelty items being sold as having the "central theme" of depicting what the statute would 
not allow. 
Also, Dr. John's argument that it should have been allowed to analogize what other 
stores around its store were selling is not supported by law. A person "who engages in some 
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to 
the conduct of others. A court should therefore examine the complainant's conduct before 
analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law." Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 498. How can 
it be argued that products such as "The Picture Book of Sensual Love," hundreds of dildos 
and "pocket pussies," anal beads and cock rings, do not have the "central theme" of 
depicting or describing sexual activities or specified anatomical areas? It is unnecessary for 
the court to consider hypothetical applications when the evidence before it is clear that the 
statute applies. 
Dr. John's cites Wil-Car, Inc. v. Village of Germantown, 153 F.Supp. 982 (E.D.Wis. 
2001) as support for its argument that the District Court erred in denying its attempt to 
introduce what other stores in the neighborhood were selling. The case is clearly 
distinguishable. In Wil-Car the court analyzed the ordinance in question under a strict 
scrutiny analysis because the city conceded that the purpose of its SOB ordinance was not 
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to combat negative secondary effects but to combat the pornography industry. See id. at 988. 
The evidence of how the statute had been applied in the past was considered in the context 
of a narrowing the language of the statute to avoid striking it down as being overbroad. The 
city argued that the language could be narrowed through a "well-understood and uniformly 
applied practice" that was established by past application. Id. at 993. In this context the 
court had no choice but to consider the past application of the ordinance and how it had been 
applied in other instances. What the court found was that the ordinance had existed for 
almost eight years and had never once been applied. 
In the case at bar, Midvale makes no claim that the statute needs to be narrowed 
through its uniformly applied practice. It stands by the clear language of the statute as 
sufficient to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Further, Dr. John's citation of Wil-Car is 
misplaced because it fails to recognize that the evidence being sought by the court in Wil-
Car was concrete (how the ordinance had been applied in the past), whereas Dr. John's 
wanted to present evidence under the guise of a hypothetical, or how it would be applied in 
the future (how would you apply the ordinance if you saw this?). The court was correct in 
denying this attempt to be drawn into hypothetical application of the law. See Hoffman, 455 
U.S. at 494-495 (Where a person "engages in some conduct that is clearly prescribed cannot 
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. A court should 
therefore examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical 
applications of the law.") 
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The language "central theme" is not unconstitutionally vague. Similar language has 
been upheld by the United States Supreme Court. Further, it cannot be said to be vague in 
Dr. John's case where the items he was selling were at the "hard core" of the statutory 
definition. The District Court's ruling should therefore be upheld and Dr. John's claim that 
the Midvale ordinance is unconstitutionally vague should be denied. 
B. Requiring an SOB license if the businesses "principal purpose" is to sell 
sexually oriented products is not vague and has been upheld in other 
cases as sufficiently clear 
The major thrust of Petitioner's argument is that there is no way of knowing if one's 
business has the "principal purpose" of selling sexually oriented products or not. It claims 
that without a more definite statement it is impossible to know if a business falls within the 
parameters of the statute. 
Dr. John's fails to recognize that the United States Supreme Court, as well as other 
District Court s, have upheld flexible language similar to that used in the Midvale ordinance 
in analyzing vagueness challenges, including "principal business purpose," "characterized 
by an emphasis on," and "major business." See Dumas v. City of Dallas, 648 F.Supp 1061, 
1076 (N.D.Tex. m6),affd,FW/PBS,Inc.v. City of Dallas, 837 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1988), 
rev'd on other grounds, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) ("principal business purpose"); Young v. 
American Mini Theaters, Inc., All U.S. 50 (1976) ("characterized by an emphasis on"); 
Stansbury v. Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1990) ("major business"). 
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Further, as stated above, the hurdles of Hoffman apply (can't claim vagueness if 
administrative process is in place; and can't claim vagueness if given adequate notice that 
ordinance applies to you). Dr. John's did not take advantage of the administrative process 
available to get clarification, did not file for an SOB license, and did not appeal the denial 
of his general business license. 
Dr. John's argues that other SOB ordinances in the area include a square footage 
requirement as further defining principle purpose, and that due to the absence of such a 
limitation Midvale's ordinance is vague. Dr. John's is barred from making this argument 
because he successfully objected to referring to other SOB ordinances below, on the grounds 
that other SOB ordinances are irrelevant. See Trial Transcript, Vol. II, page 369, lines 15-25, 
page 370, lines 1-16.8 
8The following exchange occurred during the bench trial: 
Mr. Fahle: I have to object to this, given this Court's consistent ruling 
throughout this trial, this Court's consistent rulings that we're 
talking about the law in Midvale, not about - - he's trying to use a 
definition from another city to say that Mr. Haltom's store is a 
sexually oriented business. I don't see how that's relevant. 
After further discussion: 
The Court: Why is it improper argument? 
Mr. Fahle: Because it doesn't - - it's not relevant to this case what the 
definition under some other ordinance is of an SOB. If it is, fine, 
we've got plenty of ordinances that say as long as you have less than 
15 percent of floor space. 
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The District Court was correct in sustaining the objection. What other ordinances 
contain is irrelevant to determining whether Midvale's ordinance is sufficiently clear. The 
District Court determined that the language was not vague, and that the sale of novelty items 
was the principal purpose of the business, stating "The Court notes that during the time of 
trial, the defense insisted that the sexually oriented products were only an "incidental" part 
of the business. The court finds the opposite to be true, particularly when one considers the 
extremely high (80%) profit margin associated with these products." Memorandum Decision 
page 9 (R. 918). The court stated further, "Additionally, the testimony at trial was clear that 
over three-fourths of the profits at Dr. John's were generated by several "novelty products." 
Id. at 10 (R. 919). 
Further, as noted by the District Court, Dr. John's holds itself out as being an SOB. 
The District Court stated, 
Dr. John's clearly held itself out as a sexually oriented business, 
starting with the large provocative sign (depicting a partially 
clad female in a provocative pose) in front of the store . . . The 
The Court: I'm going to sustain the objection. We're not talking about Omaha 
or Missouri or Texas, we're talking about the same county, in 
essence, but I'm going to just delete this as an issue, counsel. I think 
Mr. Hathaway: Well, that's fine your honor, as long as the defendant himself, 
then, will be precluded from saying, "We've met somehow 
the floor space requirement that fit within--" 
The Court: No, I'm not going to allow that. 
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store advertised in an adult magazine. The magazine adds 
referenced "marital aids and adult videos" combined with a 
picture of a female in a similar partially clad, provocative pose." 
Memorandum Decision, page 9 (R. 918). When considering the amount, variety, and 
character of the novelty items displayed in its store, in conjunction with the advertising 
mentioned above, it is appropriate to determine, as the District Court did, that 'The 
defendants should have been aware that their conduct fell within the scope of the ordinance." 
Id. 
It was the testimony of Mr. John A. Coil, Chief Financial Officer of Doctor John's, 
that the principal purpose of coming into Utah was to fill the sex novelty market, with the 
term novelty being a term of art in the industry that pertains to marital aids, etc. See 
generally Trial Transcript Volume I, page 173, lines 21-25, page 174, lines 1-25, page 175, 
lines 1-14. He had read an article about the potential appointment of a Utah Porn Czar and 
felt like this was a community that was provincial and had far too long been repressed 
sexually. Id. After reading the article he decided Utah would be a prime place to open up 
one of his novelty businesses. His testimony was as follows: 
Q. And you understood that to mean that there were a large 
number of sexually repressed people in the State of Utah that 
were inviting you to provide services and the product that's sold 
in Doctor John's, Inc., correct? 
A. That would be a fair restatement, as I recall 
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Id. at 174-75. The court below took special note of the boldness of Mr. Coil's statement in 
determining that there was no question Dr. John's principal purpose was to sell novelty 
items, or sexually oriented products. See Memorandum Decision, page 10 (R. 919). 
In order to avoid technical manipulations by SOB operators, Midvale city has drafted 
a flexible ordinance with reasonable breadth. Perhaps the Court said it best at the hearing 
on Plaintiffs second application for a temporary restraining order: 
In this case I cannot find that there is anything inappropriate 
about the ordinance, nor is there anything over broad or vague 
about the same. The language in 5.56 is language that would be 
commonly understood by a reasonable thinking person. It is not 
complex language. It is not language that is -1 guess what you 
would call legalese. It is simple, understandable, everyday 
words. "Principal purpose," "sexually oriented." Those are 
words that anyone would understand and I so find. 
November 21, 2000 Hearing Transcript, attached hereto as Addendum "F", at 3. The 
principal purpose language protects the city from SOB operators like Dr. John's who could 
carry on an SOB under the guise that it's not its "main" or "sole" purpose. The principal 
purpose language is flexible and allows the city to determine that a store can have one or 
more primary purposes. This avoids the technical manipulation of SOB operators who do 
not want to be subject to the ordinance. 
Therefore, this court should uphold the District Court's conclusion that the language 
"principal purpose" is not vague. The language is clear to a man of common intelligence. 
The language is written so that it can be reasonably flexible to avoid abuses by business 
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owners. There was an administrative process available to Dr. John's that it never took 
advantage of. The facts show that the principal purpose of Dr. John's was to sell novelty 
items, and that Dr. John's items were at the "hard core" of the definition where no vagueness 
can be claimed. The court should therefore uphold the Midvale ordinance as constitutional. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT 
MIDVALE'S ORDINANCE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A PRIOR 
RESTRAINT ON PROTECTED SPEECH 
A, The District Court was correct in holding that the doctrine of prior 
restraint does not apply to the facts at hand 
Prior restraint only arises where the content of expression is subject to censorship. See 
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (where a statute allowing the 
closure of a newspaper as a public nuisance if it proved to print malicious and slanderous 
materials was deemed a prior restraint because it tried to censor the expression prior to its 
being printed rather than punish it after the fact); see also O 'Connor v. City and County of 
Denver, 894 F.2d 1210, 1220 (10th Cir. 1990), ("Governmental action constitutes a prior 
restraint when it is directed to suppressing speech because of its content before the speech 
is communicated."). 
Here, Midvale's SOB ordinance does not ban the sale of sexually oriented items or 
grant officials the discretion to suppress speech based on its content. Rather, it simply 
requires SOB owners to obtain an SOB license before commencing their operation. The 
District Court's treatment of this doctrine is especially persuasive: 
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For the same reasons, the Court concludes that the prior 
restraints doctrine is simply not applicable in this case because 
the defendants' inability for operation of a sexually oriented 
business is strictly due to the defendant's failure to apply for a 
sexually oriented business license. The defendants' inability to 
operate such a business has nothing to do with the content of 
any protected speech which may be marginally attributable to 
the sexually oriented products that they were selling. In other 
words, there was no censorship involved. 
Moreover, as pointed out by Justice White in his dissenting 
opinion in FW/PBS, 439 U.S. at 244-45, the prior restraint 
analysis does not apply where the ordinance was designed to 
prevent secondary effects and not the dissemination of ideas or 
expression. In discussing the Dallas ordinance in that case, 
Justice White noted that ". . .the ordinance is in no way aimed 
at regulating what may be sold or offered in the covered 
business. With a license, operators can sell anything but obscene 
publications. Without one - without satisfying the licensing 
requirements - they can sell nothing because the city is justified 
in enforcing the ordinance to avoid the likely unfavorable 
consequences attending unregulated sexually oriented 
businesses." Id. The prior restraint doctrine is inapplicable in 
this case for the same reasons; the ordinance in question is 
aimed at preventing secondary effect rather than the 
dissemination of expression. 
Memorandum Decision, page 6-8 (R. 915-917). 
The facts at bar are similar to those dealt with by the Utah Supreme Court in Ogden 
City v. Eagle Books, Inc. 586 P.2d 436 (Utah 1978). In that case, the city of Ogden appealed 
from a summary judgement that denied injunctive relief prohibiting Eagle Books from 
operating a bookstore without a business license. See id. at 436. Eagle Books had 
successfully persuaded the District Court that any enjoinder of its business, although not 
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properly licensed to do business, would constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint on its 
right to free speech. See id. at 437. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court flatly rejected Eagle Book's argument and 
reversed the District Court s's decision. It held that "[t]he doctrine of 'prior restraint' has 
no application to the facts of this case" because "Ogden City has lawfully invoked the 
sanction of license revocation." Id. The Court stated that: 
Once the license has been properly revoked and a business 
nevertheless continues to operate, the usual remedy is a 
misdemeanor prosecution. What Ogden City seeks here is an 
injunction. Such an action lies, not only against these 
defendants, but against anyone else operating a business in 
Ogden City without a license. 
Id. In other words, the Court believed that a city's enforcement of its licensing ordinances, 
when applied uniformly, could not be curtailed by the doctrine of prior restraint. 
Here, as in Eagle Books, Midvale City is simply enforcing the provisions of its 
licensing ordinance. The District Court was correct in determining that the case at bar 
involves a licensing issue as opposed to a censorship issue. Midvale's ordinance does not 
censor the sale of products in any way. The city would not object to Defendant's sale of 
sexually oriented products if they simply applied for and received a sexually oriented 
business license, something Defendants have yet to do. Therefore, the doctrine of prior 
restraint has no application to this case. 
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B. Even if the doctrine of prior restraint did apply to the case at bar, 
Midvale's ordinance would still not violate the doctrine 
Dr. John's argues in point one and point six of its brief that the Midvale ordinance 
constitutes a prior restraint on speech for the following reasons: 1) it leaves discretion in the 
hands of one person to decide how to interpret the ordinance; 2) the ordinance fails to 
provide for prompt judicial review of license denial; and 3) it does not leave adequate 
alternative avenues of communication open. Even if the doctrine of prior restraint applied, 
these arguments would still not render Midvale's SOB ordinance unconstitutional. 
United States Supreme Court cases, " . . . addressing prior restraint have identified 
two evils that will not be tolerated in such schemes." FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 
225 (1990). First, "a scheme that places unbridled discretion in the hands of a government 
official or agency constitutes a prior restraint and may result in censorship." Id. at 225-26 
(quoting Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988)). Second, 
"prior restraint that fails to place limits on the time within which the decision-maker must 
issue the license is impermissible." Id. at 226. 
1. Midvale's SOB ordinance does not give one single official 
unbridled discretion 
Midvale's SOB ordinance does not give a single official unbridled discretion to 
determine whether a business is required to obtain an SOB license. The responsibility of 
determining whether an individual needs an SOB license is placed in the hands of "business 
license officials." See M.C.C. § 5.56.130. However, their decisions are not final. "If the 
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license is denied or approved with qualifications, or if a notice of suspension, revocation or 
citation of a civil fine is imposed, the applicant or licensee may file an appeal with the 
business license administrator." Id. at § 5.56.360(A). After an evidentiary hearing, the 
business license administrator renders findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a 
recommended decision to the City Administrator. See id. at § 5.56.360(E). Applicants then 
have seven days to file any objections to the business license administrator's decision, after 
which the City Administrator may accept or reject the recommendation. See id. at § 
5.56.360(G). The statute creates three levels of review before a license can be denied. The 
ordinance is clear that no one official has unbridled discretion. 
Dr. John's cites Nichols v. Village ofPelham Manor, 91A F.Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y.) 
as support for its claim that the ordinance vests unbridled discretion in the hands of one 
individual. The case is clearly distinguishable. In Nichols an ordinance that allowed the 
Chief of Police to grant or deny licenses was stricken down as unconstitutional for failure 
to have an appeals process. The Chief of Police was given sole discretion to decide what 
was necessary to preserve "good order" and avoid "annoyance." Unlike that ordinance, 
Midvale's ordinance contains explicit language that gives meaningful guidance to the license 
administrator, and places the interpretation on the business license officials, as well as 
business license administrator and city administrator. See generally M.C.C. § 5.56.130. 
Unlike Nichols, Midvale's ordinance provides for prompt appeal and review of a license 
denial. The power to interpret the statute does not lie strictly with one person. This, coupled 
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with the fact that Midvale's ordinance gives meaningful standards that the District Court felt 
were "plain language that anyone would understand" distinguishes the facts before this court 
from those in the Nichols case. 
Midvale's ordinance does not grant unbridled discretion to one authority, and is 
therefore constitutional and should be upheld. 
2. Midvale's SOB ordinance provides for prompt judicial review of 
a license denial 
In FW/PBS the Supreme Court stated that a "scheme that fails to set reasonable time 
limits on the decisionmaker creates the risk of indefinitely suppressing permissible speech" 
and is therefore unconstitutional. 493 U.S. 226. In FW/PBS the court struck down an 
ordinance that allowed 30 days for a chief of police to approve the issuance of a license, but 
did not provide for any restriction on when the necessary health, fire, and building 
department inspections needed to take place. See generally id. The ordinance would 
therefore allow a city to postpone the granting of a license indefinitely by simply not sending 
the fire department out to inspect the premises. This was held unconstitutional. 
Midvale's ordinance deals with this problem by placing reasonable time restrictions 
on both the inspecting agencies as well as the city administrators. Upon receipt of an 
application, Midvale is required to determine whether the application is incomplete and 
whether additional information is necessary within seven days. See M.C.C. 
§ 5.56.130(E)(1). Once an application is deemed to be complete, the city has up to forty-five 
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days to complete its inspections and approve or deny the license. See id. at § 5.56.130(E). 
If a reviewing agency does not disapprove of the premises to be used for the business within 
thirty days, or after obtaining a fifteen day extension period, the premises shall be deemed 
approved by the reviewing agency. See id. 
If an ordinance includes reasonable time limits wherein a licensing authority must act, 
the ordinance passes constitutional muster. See Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1500 (11th 
Cir. 1994) ( forty-five day period for administrator's decision to grant or deny license valid 
not unreasonable); TK's Video, Inc. v. Denton County, Tex., 830 F.Supp. 335, 345-47 (E.D. 
Tex. 1993) (sixty-day time period for review of licensing application for adult bookstore 
valid); ChesapeakeB & M, Inc. v. Harford County, Md, 831 F.Supp. 1241, 1249-1250 (D. 
Md. 1993) (forty-four day time period for review of adult bookstore licensing application 
not unreasonable); Wolff v. City of Monticello, 803 F.Supp. 1568, 1574 (D.Minn. 1992) 
(ninety-day time period for decision on adult bookstore license application not 
unreasonable); City of Colorado Springs v. Baby Dolls, 896 P.2d 272, 282 (Col. 1995) 
(forty-day period for decision to grant or deny SOB ordinance viewed as not unreasonable). 
These cases support a finding that forty-five days is a reasonable time period to grant 
or deny a license. Therefore, Midvale's ordinance passes constitutional muster and should 
be upheld. 
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C. Dr. John's argument that the ordinance fails to leave open adequate 
alternative avenues of communication reads into the ordinance a zoning 
restriction that does not exist 
The doctrine that a city must leave open "adequate alternative avenues of 
communication" when passing SOB ordinances argued in point five of Dr. John's brief is 
inapplicable to the case at bar. Dr. John's attempt to apply this doctrine to the Midvale 
ordinance tortures legal reasoning. 
Dr. John's argues that a city must leave some properly zoned areas wherein SOB's 
may locate. It argues further that since Midvale's SOB ordinance does not contain any 
zoning restrictions, it is fair to read into that absence the conclusion that there must be 
nowhere that a SOB can locate. Dr. John's states, "On its face, this ordinance creates an 
impossible situation: a business must be located in a properly zoned place; and there are no 
properly zoned places . . . Defendants are left not knowing whether it is even possible to 
obtain the kind of license that must be obtained." Brief of Appellant at 39. 
To the contrary, common sense dictates that the absence of zoning restrictions means 
there are no restrictions on where an SOB can locate. In Renton (cited as support by Dr. 
John's), the SOB ordinance included zoning restrictions stating no SOB could locate within 
1000 feet of a church or school. The court held that it is not permissible for a city to restrict 
zoning to the extent that there would be nowhere that an SOB could locate. 475 U.S. at 931. 
Midvale specifically removed itself from the Renton "adequate alternative avenues" 
analysis by excluding any zoning language in its ordinance. The Midvale ordinance places 
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no restrictions on where an SOB may locate or how many SOB's may locate together. Dr. 
John's refuses to accept the fact that the only thing hindering it from operating a sexually 
oriented business in Midvale is simply applying for an SOB license. Midvale's ordinance 
would allow it to establish twenty-five SOB's all in a row if it would only apply. 
Dr. John's claim that it does not know if it is even possible to obtain an SOB license 
due to zoning restrictions ignores the fact that it never even applied to get one. Arguing that 
the absence of a zoning restriction somehow equates into a zoning ban on establishing an 
SOB is illogical and should not be entertained by this court as grounds upon which the 
Midvale ordinance could be stricken down. 
VI. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR BUSINESSES 
OPERATING WITHOUT A LICENSE 
In Ogden City v. Eagle Books, Inc. 586 P.2d 436 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme 
Court established that injunctive relief is appropriate where a business is operating without 
a valid license. In Ogden City, the city of Ogden appealed from a summary judgement that 
denied injunctive relief prohibiting Eagle Books from operating a bookstore without a 
business license. See id. at 436. Eagle Books had successfully persuaded the District Court 
that any enjoinder of its business, although not properly licensed to do business, would 
constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint on its right to free speech. See id. at 437. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court flatly rejected Eagle Book's argument and 
reversed the District Court's decision. See id. It held that "[t]he doctrine of 'prior restraint' 
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has no application to the facts of this case" because "Ogden City has lawfully invoked the 
sanction of license revocation." Id. The Court Stated that: 
Once the license has been properly revoked and a business 
nevertheless continues to operate, the usual remedy is a 
misdemeanor prosecution. What Ogden City seeks here is an 
injunction. Such an action lies, not only against these 
defendants, but against anyone else operating a business in 
Ogden City without a license. 
Id. This clearly establishes that an injunction is appropriate remedy that was correctly 
granted by the court. 
Here, as in Eagle Books, Midvale City is simply enforcing the provisions of its 
licensing ordinance which allows the issuance of injunctive relief against the individuals 
who operate sexually oriented businesses without the appropriate license. In other words, 
this case involves a licensing issue as opposed to a censorship issue. The District Court was 
correct in granting the injunction and its ruling should be upheld. 
Further, Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61 (Utah 1981) establishes that the violation 
of a land-use restriction is enough to establish irreparable harm necessary to grant an 
injunction. In Baxter, the district court had granted plaintiff Utah County an injunction 
against defendant's commercial use of a single-family residence in violation of the county's 
zoning ordinance. See id. at 62. Under the state zoning statute in effect at that time, both 
injunctive and criminal prosecution were provided as alternate remedies for zoning 
violations. See id. at 64. On appeal, the defendants argued that Utah County failed to show 
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irreparable harm because there was an alternative remedy available at law, namely criminal 
prosecution. See id. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed and stated that "enforcement 
officers should be empowered to seek civil redress rather than proceed in every case by 
criminal prosecution." Id.. The rationale was as follows: 
An injunction should not be issued to prevent the commission 
of a crime, if the only reason for preventing it is that it is a 
crime. But, if the wrong complained of is injurious to property 
interests or civil rights, or if it is a public nuisance, either in the 
opinion of the court or in virtue of a statute or an ordinance 
making it a nuisance, the fact that it is a violation of a criminal 
statute or ordinance does not take away the authority of a court 
of civil jurisdiction to prevent the injury or abate the nuisance. 
Id. at 64. The Court continued by stating, "it may fairly be said that under the foregoing 
analysis, a showing that the zoning ordinance had been violated is tantamount to a showing 
of irreparable injury to the public." Id. at 65. 
This Court's analysis in Baxter regarding irreparable harm is applicable to the present 
case. Under Midvale City Code, the operation of a sexually oriented business without the 
proper license constitutes a class B misdemeanor. feM.C.C. §5.56.370. Violators are also 
subject to a suit for injunction. See M.C.C. § 5.56.330. As in Baxter, Midvale's licensing 
officers "should be empowered to seek civil redress rather than proceed in every case by 
criminal prosecution. See 635 P.2d at 64. Thus, "a showing that the [sexually oriented 
business] ordinance has been violated is tantamount to a showing of irreparable injury to the 
public." 
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As established above, there is no question that Dr. John's has violated Midvale's SOB 
ordinance. The District Court was therefore correct in determining that such a violation 
would cause irreparable harm to Midvale City and that injunctive relief was an appropriate 
remedy. The District Court's decision should be upheld. 
VII. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE 
REQUIREMENT THAT A BUSINESS OBTAIN A VALID LICENSE 
BEFORE OPERATING 
Dr. John's argues that his customers have a right of privacy to buy sexually oriented 
items and that this right somehow extends him the right to sell these items without a 
legitimate business license. Dr. John's argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, 
requiring that a business have a legitimate business license prior to operating has absolutely 
nothing to do with the right of privacy. The right of privacy only extends to "those matters 
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" or which are "implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty..." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,191-192(1986). There is no case 
on the books that establishes that U.S. citizens have a fundamental right to use sexually 
oriented products between themselves and that this privacy right extends to sexually oriented 
businesses in such a way that it prohibits the city from requiring proper licensing to carry out 
its business. Certainly such a right is not "deeply rooted" in our nation's history or "implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty." 
Second, all of the cases cited by Dr. John's to establish a right of privacy dealt with 
statutes that criminalized conduct, banning the conduct outright. See generally Roe v. Wade, 
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410 U.S. 113 (1973) (a Texas statute criminalizing the performance of abortions is stricken 
down as unconstitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (where a statute 
criminalizing the use of contraceptive devices was declared a violation of the right of 
privacy); and Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (where a statute criminalizing 
consensual acts of sodomy within the privacy of the home was declared unconstitutional 
under the Georgia constitution). All of these cases are distinct from the one at hand for a 
very simple reason: the Midvale ordinance does not place a ban on any conduct. To the 
contrary, it allows the sale of any sexual novelty item, requiring only that the seller obtain 
an appropriate license. To be analogous to the statutes cited above, the Midvale ordinance 
would have to criminalize the use, sale, or possession of sexual novelty items, which it 
simply does not do. 
Further, Dr. John's argues that in Griswold the court extended the right of privacy 
to not only the marital couple using contraceptives in the bedroom, but also to the vendor 
who wanted to sale the contraceptive devices. Dr. John's then argues that the holding of 
Griswold establishes that those businesses that wanted to sell the birth control devices could 
then do so without a legitimate business license, and that requiring Dr. John's to apply for 
and receive an SOB license in order to sale sex toys is therefore a violation of privacy. This 
is obviously not the holding of Griswold. The court in Griswold did not hold that the vendor 
of birth control could function without a legitimate business license, and it did not hold that 
the sale of sexually oriented items is protected by privacy. 
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Simply put, requiring that a business have a business license has absolutely nothing 
to do with any privacy right. The right of privacy does not trump the right of a city to 
instigate licensing schemes that help to maintain order and control the negative secondary 
effects of certain types of businesses. Dr. John's claim that it is cloaked in a right of privacy 
that removes it from obtaining an appropriate business license is incorrect, not supported by 
the cases it cites as authority, and should be rejected by this court as it was rejected by the 
District Court below. 
VIII. APPELLANT'S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS SHOULD BE 
DISMISSED BECAUSE APPELLANT FAILS TO ADEQUATELY RAISE OR 
BRIEF "DIFFERENT ANALYSIS" UPON WHICH A DECISION CAN BE 
MADE 
Dr. John's argues that they "may well have additional protections under the Utah 
Constitution," urging the court to expand the protection of Article 1 Section 15 to grant more 
protection to the sale of sexually oriented products than that required by the First 
Amendment. Dr. John's argument fails on both procedural and substantive grounds. 
First, this Court should not address the Utah Constitutional issues because "as a 
general rule, we will not engage in state constitutional analysis unless an argument for 
different analyses under the state and federal constitutions is briefed." State v. Lafferty, 749 
P.2dl239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988). Justice Durham, in her dissent to State v. Davis, 912V 2d 
388 (Utah 1998), stated, "This court's language in Lafferty was intended to discourage the 
practice by some litigants of making federal constitutional arguments and then mentioning, 
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as an afterthought, that the act in question "also" violates state constitutional law, without 
further explanation." Id. at 394. 
Dr. John's periphery treatment of its state constitutional claim does not set forth any 
different analyses upon which this court could decide the case. It also does not meet the 
requirements to brief its claims set out in Lafferty. The argument is included as an 
afterthought at the end of a forty-four page brief, referring to only one state case, and two 
unrelated cases in other jurisdictions.9 It does not analyze the contours of state constitutional 
law nor the historical background of the constitutional language as required by West v. 
Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994), which is cited as support for Dr. John's 
claim. 
In West this court discussed that it had been criticized for not developing an a 
consistent approach for cases in which both state and federal constitutional claims are made. 
9Dr. John's citation to City of Portland v. Tidyman, 759 P.2d 242 (Or. 1988) as 
support for its claim is misplaced. As cited by Dr. John's in West, e.g., the Utah 
Supreme Court only looks to sibling states construing similar constitutional provisions. 
Id. at 1013. Further, West recognized that only cases from states that have identical 
language is viewed for guidance in determining the meaning of Article 1 Section 15. See 
generally id. at 1016. Oregon's constitutional language protects the right to "speak, 
write, or print freely on any subject whatsoever." This is not a similar constitutional 
provision to Utah's Article I Section 15. Dr. John's concedes as much stating Oregon's 
constitutional language is "arguably a bit broader than our own Constitution." Further, 
Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) was not decided on the basis of free speech, 
but on Georgia's constitutional provision protecting citizens from unreasonable search 
and seizure. Id. at 22, n.2. Powell is therefore not based on similar constitutional 
language and the legal analysis of the case is entirely inapplicable to the case at bar. 
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Id. at 1005. In response to this criticism, the court discussed four alternative theories for 
dealing with the problem and chose to apply the primacy approach to the analysis of a 
Article I Section 15 claim that dealt with defamation. In the primacy approach "a state court 
looks first to state constitutional law, develops independent doctrine and precedent, and 
decides federal questions only when state law is not dispositive." Id. at 1007. 
In West, this Court was faced with determining if the state constitution protected 
expressions of opinion in newspaper editorials from defamation actions. The court 
considered extensive state case law, the text of the constitutional language, and a thorough 
historical analysis of the intent of the Constitutional drafters. See generally id. at 1007-1020. 
The court determined that due to the historical fighting between the two main newspapers 
of the day, as well as comments made during debates surrounding Article I Section 15, that 
it was the intent of the drafters to have a free and uninhibited press. The court therefore 
determined that defamation claims based on opinions written in editorials are not actionable. 
As demonstrated in West, the information necessary to determine whether the Utah 
Constitution ought to grant more protection than the First Amendment is extensive, if not 
exhaustive. It requires more than simply claiming as an afterthought that the court extended 
the protection in a different context and should do so again, without setting forth any 
"different analysis" whereon the court could decide the case under the state claim. See State 
v. Vigil 922 P.2d 15, 28 (Utah.Ct.App.1996) ("It is well established that this court will 
decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief."); see also State 
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v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005,1007 n. 3 (Utah.Ct.App. 1993) (declining to address defendant's state 
constitutional argument for lack of adequate briefing). 
Dr. John's has not done the work necessary to present a state constitutional claim to 
the court. If a decision were to be made based on state constitutional grounds it would be 
up to the court to do all of the heavy lifting of the research and analysis necessary to justify 
such a decision. Lafferty places the burden of raising and briefing different analytical claims 
squarely on the back of the proponent of the claim, wisely refusing to allow litigants to raise 
bald claims and then require that the court find justification for them. The District Court was 
therefore correct in not even addressing the state constitutional claims. This court should 
uphold the District Court and likewise decide the issues based only on federal law. 
Finally, Dr. John's argument that the Utah Constitution should be extended to grant 
more protection to the sale of sexually oriented products than required by the First 
Amendment is not in keeping with the state's jurisprudence, history, or best interests. As 
mentioned above, the only area wherein the State's free speech protection has been extended 
beyond that required by federal law is in the area of defamation, and more specifically in the 
area of speech expressed during heated and lively political battles. This extension is 
necessary in protecting speech that is "core" to the concept and purpose of free speech and 
its place in a democratic environment. 
It would be unwise for this court to extend heightened protection for this type of 
expression, especially when it has been universally recognized that the existence of 
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businesses that deal in these wares cause deleterious secondary effects that can blight 
communities, cause the spread of disease, and create significant increases in crime. By 
extending heightened protection under Utah law this court would further restrict a city's 
"reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems." 
Renton, 475 U.S. at 931. 
Therefore, due to a failure to adequately raise and brief different state constitutional 
claims, as well as the fact that no case law or historical analysis can support an argument that 
heightened protection ought to be granted to the sale of sexually oriented items under the 
Utah Constitution, this court should uphold the District Court's decision and base the 
grounds of its ruling solely on Federal law. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the ruling of the District Court that Midvale's SOB 
ordinance is a constitutionally valid content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation 
should be upheld. The District Court's injunction should therefore remain in place. 
DATED this 1 ? ^ l a y of April, 2002. 
PETER STIRBA 
BENSON L. HATHAWAY 
CORBIN B. GORDON 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
August 16, 2000 amendments to Chapter 5.56 of the Midvale City Code. 
Cited portions of the Trial Transcript. 
Dr. John's Business License Application dated 6/14/00. 
Letter from Susan Shreeve to John Haltom dated 6/28/00. 
Dr. John's General Business License dated 8/08/00. 
November 21, 2000 Hearing Transcript 
ADDENDUM A 
ORDINANCE 08/16/2000 
An Ordinance amending Chapter 5.56 of the Midvale City Code concerning 
Sexually Oriented Businesses by adding Section 5.56,000 and amending Sections 
5.56.130 and 5.56.360. 
WHEREAS, The City Council finds that additional administrative changes not 
included in the November 1999 amendment to this section are needed to further update 
this section; and 
WHEREAS, sexually oriented businesses require special supervision from the 
public safety agencies of the City in order to protect and preserve the health, safety, 
morals and welfare of the patrons of such businesses as well as the citizens of the City; 
and 
WHEREAS, licensing is a legitimate and reasonable means of accountability to 
ensure that operators of sexually oriented businesses comply with reasonable regulations 
and to ensure that operators do not knowingly allow their establishments to be used as 
places of illegal sexual activity or solicitations; and 
WHEREAS, there is convincing documented evidence that sexually oriented 
businesses, because of their very nature, have a deleterious effect on both the existing 
businesses around them and the surrounding residential areas adjacent to them, causing 
increased crime and the downgrading of property values; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council desires to minimize and control these adverse 
effects and thereby protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry; protect the 
citizens from increased crime; preserve the quality of life; preserve the property values 
and character of surrounding neighborhoods and deter the spread of urban blight; and 
WHEREAS, it is not the intent of this amendment to supress any speech 
activities protected by the First amendment; and 
WHEREAS, the City Council finds that it is in the best interest of the citizens to 
amend the ordinance. 
NOW THEREFORE, be it ordained by the City as follows: 
Section 5.56.000 entitled "Purpose of Section" is added as follows: 
5.56.000 Purpose of Section. It is the purpose and object of this section 
that the City establish reasonable and uniform regulations governing the time, place and 
manner of operation of sexually oriented businesses and their employees in the City. 
This Section shall be construed consistent with the governmental interests of the City in 
protecting its citizens from increased crime in the preservation of its quality of life and 
property values and the character of the City's neighborhoods and businesses: and to deter 
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the spread of urban blight and to protect against the spread of sexually transmitted 
diseases. 
Section 5.56.130 is amended as follows: 
5.56.130 License-Issuance Conditions. The City business license official shall approve 
the issuance of a license to the applicant within thirty (30) days after receipt of any 
application, unless the official finds one or more of the following: 
A. The applicant is under eighteen (18) years of age or any higher age, if the 
license sought requires a higher age; 
B. The applicant is overdue in payment to the City of taxes, fees, fines or 
penalties assessed against the applicant or imposed on the applicant in 
relation to a sexually oriented business; 
C The applicant has falsely answered a material question or request for 
information as authorized by this chapter: 
D. The applicant has been convicted of a violations of a provision of this 
chapter within two years immediately preceding the application; however, 
the fact that a conviction is being appealed shall have no effect on the 
denial; 
E. The premises to be used for the business have been disapproved by the 
Salt lake County Health Department, the City Fire Department, the City 
Police Department, the City building officials or the City zoning officials 
as being not in compliance with applicable laws and ordinances of the 
City. If any of the foregoing reviewing agencies cannot complete their 
review within the thirty (30) day approval or denial period, the agency or 
department may obtain from the City business license official an extension 
of time for their review of no more than fifteen (15) days. The total time 
for the City to approve or deny a license shall not exceed forty-five (45) 
days from the receipt of the application. If a reviewing agency does not 
disapprove of the premises to be used for the business within 30 days, or 
after obtaining a 15 day extension from the City business license official, 
does not disapprove the premises within the 15 day extension period, the 
premises shall be deemed approved by the reviewing agency. Businesses 
located outside of the corporate boundaries of the City, but requiring a 
license under this chapter, may be denied a license pursuant to this chapter 
if the business does not have a valid business license to conduct business 
at the business location; 
1. Upon receipt of an application, all departments required to 
review the applications shall determine within 7 days. 
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whether or not the application is incomplete in items 
needed for processing. Incomplete applications shall 
immediately be returned to the applicant with a 
specification of the item (s) which are incomplete. 
2. The time for processing applications specified in this 
section shall begin to run from the receipt of a completed 
application. 
F. The license fees required by this chapter or by other ordinances have not 
been paid; 
G. All applicable sales and use taxes have not been paid; 
H. An applicant for the proposed business is in violation of or not in 
compliance with this chapter; 
I. An applicant has been convicted or pled nolo contendre to a crime: 
1. Involving prostitution; exploitation of prostitution; 
aggravated promotion of prostitution; aggravated 
exploitation of prostitution, solicitation of sex acts; sex 
acts for hire; compelling prostitution; aiding prostitution; 
sale, distribution or display of material harmful to minors; 
sexual performance by minors; possession of/or distribution 
of pornography: possession of or distribution of child 
pornography; public lewdness; indecent exposure; any 
crime involving sexually abuse or exploitation of a child; 
sexually assault; or aggravated sexual assault; rape; forcible 
sodomy, forcible sexual abuse, incest; harboring a runaway 
child; criminal attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to 
commit any of the foregoing offenses or offenses, 
involving similar element elements from any jurisdictions 
regardless of the exact title of the offense; for which: 
a. Less than two years have elapsed from the 
date of conviction, if the conviction is a 
misdemeanor offense, or less than five 
years, if the convictions are of two or more 
misdemeanors within the five years; 
b. Less that five years have elapsed from the 
date of conviction, if the offense is a felony; 
2. The fact that a conviction is being appealed shall have no 
effect on the disqualification pursuant to this section. 
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Section 5.56.360 is amended to read: 
5.56.360 Appeals 
A. If the license is denied or approved with qualifications, or if a 
notice of suspension, revocation or citation of a civil fine is 
imposed, the applicant or licensee may file an appeal with the 
business license administrator. 
B. Filing of an appeal must be within ten (10) days of the date of 
service of the notice of denial, qualified approval, suspension, 
revocation of civil fine. Upon receiving the notice of such appeal, 
the business license administrator shall schedule a hearing before 
the hearing board within twenty (20) days from the date of the 
appeal unless such time shall be extended for good cause. 
C The hearing board shall hold a public hearing on the record, and 
take such facts and evidence as necessary to determine whether the 
denial, qualified approval, suspension, revocation or civil fine was 
proper under the law. 
D. The burden of proof shall be on the City. 
E. After the hearing, the license administrator shall have seven (7) 
working days, unless extended for good cause, in which to render 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended decision to 
the City Administrator. 
F. Either party may object to the recommendation of the hearing 
board by filing the party's objections and reasons, in writing to the 
City Administrator within seven (7) days following the 
recommendation. In the event the hearing board recommends 
upholding a suspension or revocation, the license shall be 
immediately suspended, and shall remain suspended until any 
subsequent appeal is decided. If no objections are received within 
seven (7) days the City Administrator may immediately adopt the 
recommendation of the hearing board. 
G. If objections are received, the City Administrator shall have ten 
(10) working days to consider such objections before issuing the 
City Administrator's final decision. The City Administrator may, 
in the City Administrator's discretion take additional evidence or 
require written memorandum on issues of fact or law. The 
standard by which the City Administrator shall review the decision 
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of the hearing board is whether substantial evidence exists on the 
record to support the hearing board's recommendations. 
This ordinance shall become effective immediately upon passage. 
APPROVED AND ADOPTED this /6>f- day of Ctu^J- , 2000. 
ATTEST: 









1 order and then also the products after and up until the 
2 Court's— 
3 THE COURT: And I assume there's a dispute as to 
4 whether the primary purpose language is applicable; is that 
5 correct? 
6 MR. FAHLE: I'm sorry, your Honor, you said there is a 
7 dispute? 
8 THE COURT: That's what I said* 
9 MR. FAHLE: There is a subject dispute, yes. 
10 MR. HATHAWAY: The last fact, your Honor, is "The 
11 defendants have never submitted an application to Midvale City 
12 for a sexually oriented business license." 
13 THE COURT: Yes, that's my understanding as well. Is 
14 that true, Mr. Fahle? 
15 MR. FAHLE: That's right, your Honor. 
16 MR. HATHAWAY: That's all I have. 
17 THE COURT: All right, that's helpful, counsel. Let 
18 me just get the present status update. Is the business closed? 
19 Is it operating without sexually — arguably sexually explicit 
20 materials? Is it operating without those materials? What's 
21 the present status? 
22 MR. HATHAWAY: The present status, as I understand it, 
23 is that it's operating, it's open and it is not presently 
24 selling the kinds of items that have been identified in the 
25 prior proceedings. 
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1 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr, Fahle. 
2 Q. BY MR. HATHAWAY: Have you seen that document before, 
3 Ms. Shreeves? 
4 A. Yes, I have. 
5 Q. What is it? 
6 A. It is an application for a business license for Doctor 
7 John's located at 6885 South State. 
8 Q. I notice in the upper right-hand corner there is 
9 handwritten "6/14/00," do you see that? 
10 A. Yes, that's the date we received it. 
11 Q. Do you remember receiving this document on or about 
12 June 14th of 2000? 
13 A. Yes, I do. 
14 MR. HATHAWAY: Your Honor, I'd offer Plaintiff's 2. 
15 THE COURT: Any objection? 
16 MR. FAHLE: No, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: It's received. 
18 (Exhibit No. 2 received into evidence) 
19 Q. BY MR. HATHAWAY: Did you review this document when 
20 you received it? 
21 A. Yes, I did. 
22 Q. What did you observe when you received it? 
23 A. I observed that there was missing information, there 
24 was no Utah State sales tax number. There's a work listed but 
25 there's no address listed as his home address. The phone 
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1 number was an out-of-state phone number, there was no date of 
2 birth, the driver's license number was missing. I subsequently 
3 found out that his last name — it looked like it was spelled 
4 H-a-1-t-o-n, it was actually t-o-m. 
5 Q. When you received this and looked at it and made these 
6 observations, what did you do? 
7 A. I contacted Mr. Haltom and requested the information 
8 that was missing off the application. 
9 Q. Did he provide it for you? 
10 A. He provided me with a date of birth and he stated that 
11 the driver's license number was (inaudible) just used a Social 
12 Security number so he did not actually have a driver's license 
13 number. I requested a home address from him and he stated that 
14 his home address was the business address. 
15 Q. After receiving this information from Mr. Haltom did 
16 you have an occasion to go and inspect the property that he 
17 proposed to open a business by? 
18 A. I did. 
19 Q. When did you do that? 
20 A. Approximately I believe it was within the next week. 
21 Q. When you inspected the premises, why don't you 
22 describe for us what you saw, 
23 A. When I entered the store I saw that he was just barely 
24 putting out his inventory. He had a couple of pieces of 
25 lingerie out, he had the picture book of sensual love making, 
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1 Q. Tell me about that, 
2 A. I told Mr. Haltom that according to what was out on 
3 the shelves so far the city would require that he apply for a 
4 sexually oriented business license unless he removed those 
5 things from the shelves. 
6 Q. Can I have you take a look at Exhibit No. 9 in that 
7 binder? 
8 A. Okay. 
9 Q. Have you seen that document before? 
10 A. Yes, I have, this is the letter I wrote Mr. Haltom. 
11 Q. What's the date of that letter? 
12 A. June 28th. 
13 Q. Does it bear your signature as the business license 
14 administrator? 
15 A. Yes, it does. 
16 MR. HATHAWAY: Your Honor, I'd offer Plaintiff's 9. 
17 THE COURT: Any objection? 
18 MR. FAHLE: Just one second, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Okay, take your time. 
20 MR. FAHLE: No objection, your Honor. 
21 I THE COURT: Nine is received. 
22 | (Exhibit No. 9 received into evidence) 
23 I Q. BY MR. HATHAWAY: Did you mail that letter to Mr. 
24 Haltom? 
25 I A. Yes, I did. 
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1 had in mind and were applying when you received the business 
2 license on June 14, 2000 from Mr. Haltom? 
3 A. Correct. 
4 Q. Is this the provision you had in mind when you 
5 inspected his premises later in June? 
6 A. Yes, it was. 
7 Q. And this is the provision from the code which you 
8 provided to Mr. Haltom under cover of your June 29th letter? 
9 A. Correct. 
10 Q. By the way, did you ever have a second occasion to 
11 provide a copy of this ordinance to Mr. Haltom? 
12 A. I did. 
13 Q. When? 
14 A. He asked for it approximately a month later, and I 
15 hand delivered another copy to him, and then his attorney, 
16 Andrew McCullough, requested that the forms be sent to him. I 
17 sent the entire SOB ordinance, part of the manual, and I sent 
18 all the requirements — I sent a check list of what Midvale 
19 City requires for an SOB application. I sent a fingerprint 
20 card. 
21 Q. Let me have you take a look at Exhibit No. 3 in that 
22 binder. Have you seen that document before? 
23 A. Yes, I have. 
24 Q. What is it? 
25 A. It is a check list that we provide for businesses that 
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1 testified that you observed at the store? 
2 A. Yes, I did, 
3 Q. Did you have any discussions with Mr. Haltora at this 
4 next visit? 
5 A. No, I did not. 
6 Q. Was he present? 
7 A. Yes, he was. 
8 Q. Did he say anything to you? 
9 A. Officer Seamons and I entered the store and he became 
10 very irate. We served him with a notice of my letter saying 
11 that his business license was going to be suspended. He 
12 started — he called us, "fucking communists," and said we 
13 needed to move back to Russia. We had him sign the acceptance 
14 of the letter and we left the store. 
15 Q. I'll hand you what we've marked as Exhibit 82. Have 
16 you seen that before? 
17 A. Yes, I have. 
18 Q. What is it? 
19 A. It is a letter I wrote to Mr. Haltom stating that we 
20 were going to suspend his business license, and that he had a 
21 right to appeal — to file an appeal if he so wished to do. 
22 Q. Is this the letter you referred to that you hand 
23 delivered to hira? 
24 A. Yes, it is. 
25 Q. And you hand delivered it to him on what date? 
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1 A. No, I have not. 
2 Q. Take a look at Exhibit No. 1, please. 
3 A. Okay. 
4 Q. Have you seen that document before? 
5 A. No, I don't believe we have this in our business file. 
6 Q. Take a look at No. 6 for just a minute, if you would. 
7 A. Okay. 
8 Q. What's that? 
9 A. That was a rewrite of the sexually oriented business 
10 section 5.56 of the Midvale City Code. 
11 Q. What's the date of that rewrite? 
12 A. August 16th. 
13 Q. Of which year? 
14 A. 2000. 
15 Q. Can you be more precise as to which sections of 5.56 
16 it amended? 
17 A. It amended Section 5.56.130 and 5.56.360. 
18 Q. Is it your understanding that this now is the part of 
19 the Midvale City ordinance as it relates to the sexually 
20 oriented business? 
21 A, Correct. 
22 MR. HATHAWAY: Your Honor, I would offer 6. 
23 THE COURT: Any objection? 
24 MR. FAHLE: One moment, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Take your time. 
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1 (Counsel reviews exhibit) 
2 MR. FAHLE: No objection, your Honor. I would note — 
3 well, no objection. 
4 THE COURT: Six is received. 
5 (Exhibit No. 6 received into evidence) 
6 Q. BY MR. HATHAWAY: Can I have you take a look at 
7 Exhibit No. 25? 
8 A. Okay. 
9 Q. Before we get to that, let me back up. Let me just 
10 back up to Exhibit 81 again. 
11 A. I'm sorry, Exhibit 8 did you say? 
12 Q. Eighty-one. It would be the Midvale City ordinance. 
13 A. Okay. 
14 Q. Take a look at Section 5.02.020, it's on page 33. 
15 THE COURT: Did you say Exhibit 82 or 81? 
16 MR. HATHAWAY: Eighty-one. 
17 Q. BY MR. HATHAWAY: It would be the fourth page back. 
18 Do you see that? 
19 A. Yes, I do. 
20 Q. What does that provision do? 
21 A. This provision states that it's unlawful to operate a 
22 business without first obtaining a business license. 
23 Q. What was the effective date of that section? 
24 A. September of 1998, it was rewritten. 
25 Q. Could you leaf over to Section 5.56.040? 
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1 ask the first question. 
2 Q. BY MR. MCCULLOUGH: Is that, in your mind, using the 
3 same criteria you used when you went into my client's business, 
4 a sexually oriented product? 
5 A. Probably, yes. 
6 Q. If you saw that on the shelves would you consider that 
7 a violation of his business license? 
8 MR. HATHAWAY: Same objection. 
9 THE COURT: Overruled, you may answer. 
10 THE WITNESS: I think probably, given the other 
11 products that were with it, I would say yes, it would be 
12 sexually oriented. Would he be denied if he had this on the 
13 shelf? 
14 Q. BY MR. MCCULLOUGH: Yes. 
15 A. No. I did not ask that his whips, chains, handcuffs 
16 be removed, nor did I — he had boobie cream and edible 
17 condoms, and no, I didn't ask that any of that be removed. 
18 Q. All of that is okay? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. It is, in your mind, sexually oriented, but it isn't a 
21 violation; is that— 
22 A. Right. 
23 THE COURT: Edible what? 
24 THE WITNESS: Condoms. 



























A. I'm sorry, I don't. I was out so many times. Most of 
the times he was there. 
THE COURT: Can I get you to speak just a little 
louder and right into the mike? Go ahead, counsel. 
Q. BY MR. HATHAWAY: When was the next occasion you 
visited the premises? 
A. After September 13th I was out again with Susan 
Shreeves on October 2nd. 
Q. To look at the inventory? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you see? 
A. That he was well stocked with several sexually 
oriented items, and I made a memo of this information for our 
city attorney at this time. 
Q. Now you characterized this product as sexually 
oriented product. Can you be more specific and tell us what it 
was you saw? 
A. There were several hundred dildos and/or vibrators in 
the shape of penises at that time, other types of sexual 
paraphernalia, as Susan made reference to also on this meeting. 
There were anal beads and stuff like that. 
Q. Do you remember seeing the videos? 
A. There were videos, and at this time I don't recall how 
many. They were wrapped with the book that went with them, so 
to look through the booklets you'd have to open the packaging 
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1 to see what was in the booklets, but there were a couple of 
2 videos and booklets. 
3 Q. Was Mr. Haltora present during this inspection? 
4 A. Yes, during this inspection he was there. 
5 Q. Did you have a conversation with him? 
6 A. We did speak, but Susan pretty much was the one that 
7 did most of the speaking as far as him already being aware of 
8 the ordinances and stuff. 
9 Q. Did you have an occasion to visit the premises after 
10 this October 2nd visit you referred to? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. When was the next time? 
13 A. We were requested to go out on the 20th and get a more 
14 accurate count of how many items, type of sexually oriented 
15 items that were on the shelves and stuff. 
16 Q. Did you take a look at the inventory on the 20th? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. What did you see? 
19 A. That it had increased by several hundred items at that 
20 time in the sexually oriented category. He had also added some 
21 other things in the clothing line. 
22 THE COURT: I can barely hear you. 
23 THE WITNESS: He had also added other items in the 
24 clothing line, but our concern was more focused on the sexually 
25 oriented items. 
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1 THE WITNESS: Approximately 500. 
2 THE COURT: Oh, 500. Thank you. 
3 Q. BY MR. HATHAWAY: And what else? 
4 A. There was approximately 2 0 female genitalia type 
5 devices, finger vibrators, and then the other stuff like 
6 pleasure rings, anal beads, other sexually oriented 
7 paraphernalia. 
8 Q. On October 24th had the number increased or decreased 
9 of these items that you identified in this memo? 
10 A. It had increased. 
11 Q. Would you read what you wrote on October 24, 2000? 
12 A. My notation says, "About 300 more and different items 
13 have been added. Approximately 200 more dildos and 100 more 
14 devices for men." 
15 Q. Did you go out again and inspect the premises where 
16 Mr. Haltora operates his business? 
17 A. After October 24th, yes, I did. 
18 Q. When? 
19 A. On November 7th Susan and I went out again at about 3 
20 in the afternoon. 
21 Q. Had there been any change in his inventory? 
22 A. No, relatively no different change, everything was 
23 still there. 
24 Q. And since November 7th — by the way, was Mr. Haltom 
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1 the State of Utah let out stories that said that there was an 
2 insufficient satisfying of the market in Salt Lake City. I 
3 said that clumsily, and I apologize. 
4 Q. And the story you're referring to is an article that 
5 you read in the Los Angeles papers, correct? 
6 A. I read an article in the Los Angeles Times, I believe, 
7 that said that Utah had appointed or was going to appoint a 
8 porn czar. 
9 Q. And you understood that to mean that there were a 
10 large number of sexually repressed people in the State of Utah 
11 that were inviting you to provide services and the product 
12 that's sold in Doctor John's, Inc., correct? 
13 A. That would be a fair restatement, as I recall. 
14 Q. By that, you're not just referring to lingerie, are 
15 you, Mr. Coil? 
16 A. I'm referring to a state — I was referring to a state 
17 of mind that I anticipated the people of Utah might have. 
18 Q. And that state of mind was satisfied, was it not, Mr. 
19 Coil, only by the sale of lingerie, as well as by the sale of 
20 adult novelties and adult videos, correct? 
21 A. I am not a sociologist. It was an off-the-cuff kind 
22 of thing, and I apologize to the people of Utah if I in any way 
23 insulted them or grouped them as a group and say that they're 
24 provincial. 
25 Q. But that's the reason why, isn't is, Mr. Coil, that 
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1 you decided to open Doctor John's in Midvale, correct? 
2 A- I believe that repressed people, when they find 
3 freedom, whether they're Russian or Spanish, as has recently 
4 happened, that market opportunities exist. People in the 
5 United States, there is certainly a holding up to the people in 
6 Utah to — I'll try to choose the right word, but some people 
7 feel like the people in Utah are provincial. 
8 Q. And that is why, is it not, Mr. Coil, that you decided 
9 to open Doctor John's, Inc. in Midvale, Utah to meet the needs 
10 of those repressed people, true? 
11 A. That would be a fair restatement of what you're 
12 saying. 
13 Q. Is is true or is it false? 
14 A. I would say it's true. 
15 Q. It's true, is it not, that had you not read the 
16 article about the porn czar you never would have opened up a 
17 store in Utah to sell lingerie, adult novelties and adult 
18 videos. 
19 A. That's a fair statement. 
20 Q. It's also true, is it not, Mr. Coil, that when you 
21 sell the novelties — and specifically I'm talking about adult 
22 videos, dildos, pocket pussies, sexual aids, your profit margin 
23 is along the lines of 80 percent. 
24 A. I feel like that that's an accurate statement. 



























P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on May 30, 2001) 
THE COURT: 
was turned on) City 








BY MR. FAHLE: 
Q. Mr. Haltom 
are the manager at 
A. Yes, that' 
(Court already in session when recorder 
of Midvale vs. Doctor John's, John Haltom. 
forward? 
Yes, your Honor. 
All right, you may call your next witness. 
I call John Haltom. 
Mr. Haltom, I think you were sworn in 
Yes, your Honor. 
And you're still under oath. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
, let me ask you, you have — you, I guess, 
the store at issue in this case? 
s correct. 
Q. How many other Doctor John stores have you owned and 
(inaudible). 
A. Approximately nine. 
Q. Nine? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Where are 
A. St. Louis, 
those stores? 
Omaha, Midvale. 
Q. What happened to the stores in St. Louis? 
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1 that it was the Court's recollection there was an agreement. 
2 Surely the temporary restraining order speaks for itself, and 
3 Ms. Shreeves testified that she understood there was an 
4 agreement, and in fact, the city issued a business license, 
5 understanding that in exchange for that license the applicant 
6 would withdraw articles or product that was a problem. 
7 It wasn't more than a couple of weeks, though, your 
8 Honor, until mid to late October when the product appeared 
9 anew, appeared again. A subsequent application for a 
10 restraining order followed, it was issued, and it was only that 
11 order that ultimately precluded sale by the defendant of the 
12 product that's been in question from the outset. 
13 Notably along the way, your Honor, and there were 
14 really two points when this could have occurred, initially when 
15 Mr. Haltom and his business was informed that he needed to get 
16 a sexually oriented business license, the ordinance allowed him 
17 to appeal, to appeal to the license administrator who would 
18 convene a panel to consider the concerns and make a decision. 
19 That appeal was not pursued. That's important, your Honor. 
20 Later after the first restraining order, after non-
21 compliance when the city finally threatened to and in fact 
22 suspended temporarily the business license, there was a request 
23 for an appeal, but it shifted, really, to the trial court and 
24 nothing was ever pursued. 
25 The reason that's important, your Honor, is because 
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1 prohibit the sale, but simply — I'm quoting again the Hoffman 
2 Estates decision, it quotes, "simply regulates the commercial 
3 marketing of items that the labels reveal may be used for an 
4 illicit purpose," close quote. 
5 Well, in this case, your Honor, again, the ordinance 
6 of Midvale seeks to regulate marketing of items which are 
7 displayed and designed to be used for a certain defined sexual 
8 purposes. Like in Hoffman Estates, the ordinance here, 
9 therefore, doesn't embrace any sort of protected non-commercial 
10 speech. If anything, it addresses the secondary effects of the 
11 sale of the product that's defined in the ordinance. 
12 Now remember what Mr. Coil said. It was sort of 
13 unsolicited and sort of unanticipated, but what he said was, 
14 "Our purpose in buying this stuff is to sell it, and when it 
15 goes out the door we could care less, it's irrelevant. We 
16 bring it in, we sell it, end of purpose." There's no 
17 untrammeled political debate going on. There's no erotic 
18 message being communicated. There is no communication, your 
19 Honor. At the very most, from the defendant's point of view, 
20 is commercial speech. They bring a product in, they sell the 
21 product. There's no displaying, there's no dancing, there's no 
22 debate, there's nothing else. It's a product that comes in and 
23 it's sold. 
24 Consequently, it's really irrelevant, and this is sort 
25 of a footnote, but it's important, and this is again the 
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1 MR. HATHAWAY: 5.61,040 is the provision that defines 
2 the sexually oriented business, and it says, "An adult 
3 bookstore or an adult video store means a commercial 
4 establishment A) which excludes minors from more than 15 
5 percent of the retail floor or shelf space of the premises." 
6 It doesn't talk about the square footage on which the material 
7 is stocked, it's the percentage of square footage from which 
8 minors are excluded. 
9 Mr. Haltom was asked on the stand, "In fact, Mr. 
10 Haltom, you exclude the minors from your premises entirely, 
11 correct?" "Yes—" 
12 MR. FAHLE: Judge, I have to — 
13 MR. HATHAWAY: —"we card anyone under—" 
14 THE COURT: Just one moment. 
15 MR. FAHLE: I have to object to this, given this 
16 Court's consistent throughout this trial, this'Court's 
17 consistent rulings that we're talking about the law in Midvale, 
18 not about — he's now trying to use a definition from another 
19 city to say that Mr. Haltom's store is a sexually oriented 
20 business. I don't see how that's relevant. 
21 THE COURT: Well, this is argument. 
22 MR. FAHLE: I understand it's argument. 
23 THE COURT: He's entitled to talk about other statutes 
24 if he believes they have relevance in argument. So are you. 
25 MR. FAHLE: Yes, if he thinks they have relevance in 
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1 argument, I don't object to that. A) it's not relevant and B) 
2 it's improper argument. 
3 THE COURT: Why is it improper argument? 
4 MR. FAHLE: Because it doesn't — it's not relevant to 
5 this case what the definition under some other ordinance is of 
6 an SOB. If it is, fine, we've got plenty of ordinances that 
7 say as long as you have less than 15 percent of floor space. 
8 THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection. We're 
9 not talking about Omaha or Missouri or Texas, we're talking 
10 about the same county, in essence, but I'm going to just delete 
11 this as an issue, counsel. I think— 
12 MR. HATHAWAY: Well, that's fine, your Honor, as long 
13 as the defendant himself, then, will be precluded from saying, 
14 J "We've met somehow the floor space requirement that fit 
within—" 
THE COURT: No, I'm not going to allow that. 
MR. HATHAWAY: That has been the discussion in prior 
arguments, prior record, and there has been some evidence of 
that having been— 
THE COURT: That's why I was inclined to consider the 













MR. HATHAWAY: In short, and it really isn't, but at 
the bottom, your Honor, the ordinance here requiring a business 
engaged in sale of the product that was sold in this case is 
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1 don't have to conduct new studies but that they have to have 
2 some studies in there is because the Supreme Court wasn't 
3 particularly concerned with the scientific validity of these 
4 studies or with whether or not they were being truthful or 
5 accurately depicted the exact secondary effects within the city 
6 where they were being applied. What they're concerned with is 
7 legislative intent, if the legislature had that in mind. The 
8 only test for that, by the way, is to look at the legislative 
9 record. 
10 Another case I would cite the Court to on that is the 
11 FTW case out of Houston. I do not have the cite off hand, it's 
12 a F. Sub case, and that is currently up in the Fifth Circuit, 
13 the City of Houston has appealed. That was precisely the 
14 problem in that case, it's a very long published opinion in F. 
15 Sub that explains that you've got to have something in there. 
16 You don't have to do new studies. 
17 THE COURT: Thank you. 
18 Mr. Hathaway, do you want to respond to that last 
19 issue? You are entitled to the last word, and that is the 
20 question that's been raised about a legislative record. It 
21 seems to me that if the statute on its face or the ordinance 
22 makes it clear what the intent was, that there is no need to 
23 bring in a legislative history or legislative record. 
24 MR. HATHAWAY: I believe that counsel argued unless 
25 the concern is raised that for whatever reason the conclusion 
-395-
1 is reached by the legislative body or not to support 
2 (inaudible). That hasn't been challenged here. Nobody has 
3 argued, "You're wrong, there's no common in crime increase, 
4 there's no blight in the neighborhood, there's no sexually 
5 transmitted disease." 
6 THE COURT: So there's no need to rebut, then. 
7 MR. HATHAWAY: So that being the case, that having not 
8 been challenged at all in any of these proceedings, the 
9 findings — and it's perfectly acceptable for Midvale City to 
10 rely on the findings of other cities, other municipalities, as 
11 it did, in reaching the conclusions that it reached. 
12 THE COURT: This Court is going to issue a memorandum 
13 decision on the issues that have been addressed with 
14 specificity. However, I am going to make an oral ruling at 
15 this time, not detailed as the memorandum will be, but general 
16 in nature. 
17 I find for the plaintiffs and dismiss the 
18 counterclaim, finding that the defendants have not met their 
19 burden of proof. There has been no credible or really no 
20 testimony that stands up on the issue of damages. 
21 The only expert who was brought in to opine on this, 
22 the only person who suggested that he had the credentials to do 
23 so, the last witness of the plaintiffs, a rebuttal witness, 
24 made it very clear that the data available makes it 
25 impossible — this was Mr. Rasmussen — to arrive at a damage 
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MID VALE CITY 
June 28, 2000 
Doctor John's 
John V Haltrom 
6885 S State St 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Dear Mr Haltrom, 
This letter is to follow up the conversation that we had on June 28, 2000 
Your business license application indicates that you were not operating a sexually 
oriented business, however , during my inspection of your inventory I found several items 
that indicate that your business would be considered sexually oriented The Picture Book 
of Sensual Love, Super Glide, Mr Prolong and nude playing cards are examples of items 
that lead me to believe that you intend to operate a sexually oriented business and I 
suggest that you remove these and any similar items from your shelves if you are not 
applying for a sexually oriented business license 
I am enclosing a copy of Midvale City's sexually oriented business license ordinances 
These ordinances state that you may not have anything which depicts or describes sexual 
activities or specified anatomical areas, or instruments, devices or paraphernalia which are 
designated for use in connection with specified sexual activities 
Further, Midvale City requests a list of your inventory for our review of all items that you 
intend to display or sell 
Based on my inspection of your business inventory, your business license application 
cannot at this time be approved due to the sexually oriented items I observed 
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at 567-7213 
Sincerely, 
Susan B Shreeve 
Business License Administrator 
655 West Center Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Phone (801) 567-7200 
Fax (801) 567-0518 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on November 21, 2000) 
THE COURT: All right. I appreciate the high quality 
of the oral argument. I appreciate the high quality of the 
written product that accompanies the same. I have read 
everything thoroughly, some of it twice, and I am of the 
opinion that a temporary restraining order remaining in effect 
until the trial is appropriate. 
I am of the opinion that the applicant — that is 
Midvale — will suffer irreparable harm by the mere violation 
of the ordinance. The articulation in the ordinance dated 
8/16/2000 — and it's the modified one — where it talks about 
what this can do to a community, that it has a deleterious 
effect on both the existing businesses around and surrounding 
residential areas, causing increased crime, or I would add even 
a potential increase of crime, and downgrading of property 
value has been considered by this Court. 
In addition, the Court has a huge concern about a 
business that is not advertised as a sexually oriented business 
where children or young adults under 19 go into the business 







on display is 
one 
adult is in the building , on the premises 
what it is, and is offended and harmed by what 
a clear 
of the reasons it 
problem that is 
se^ ros to iue why 






1 J sexually oriented materials ought to be designated a$ such, 
2 I do not believe that Midvale or any other community 
3 J has the right to keep sexually oriented businesses out of the 
4 community, but merely that they have the right to regulate how 
5 J those are operated by denying or granting a license, and they 
6 J set standards for the granting of the licenses. 
7 J in this case I cannot find that there is anything 
8 j inappropriate about the ordinance/ nor is there anything 
9 overbroad or vague about the same. The language in 5.S6 is 
10 language that would be commonly understood by a reasonable 
11 J thinking person. It is not complex language. It is not 
12 J language that is — I guess what you would call legalese. 
13 It is simple, understandable, everyday words, vvPrincipal 
14 I purpose," "sexually oriented." Those are words that anyone 
15 would understand and I so find. 
16 Additionally, the threatened injury to the applicant 
17 I that matters to which I just alluded in my opinion outweigh 
IS j whatever damage or injury to the defendant that could occur. 
19 I This Court finds that the damage to the defendant, if it 
20 occurs, would be in the form of monetary damages, and if 
21 ultimately the plaintiff, Midvale, does not prevail, then the 
22 I defendants are entitled to damages. It is this Court' s finding 
23 that these damages would be monetary in nature. 
24 I It is also my perception and I so find that the 
25 injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. On the 
MIDV01510 
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1 contrary, I believe it supports the public's interest in 
2 maintaining a community where there are regulations that do 
3 not preclude the operations of businesses such as this, but 
4 I set standards for appropriate operation of the same, so that 
5 J members of the community that don't want to be exposed to this 
6 have a choice before they are sort of confronted with what they 
7 J may not want to see. Again, the ordinance itself speaks about 
8 the deleterious effects that are possible and perhaps even 
9 likely. 
10 I Finally, the issue of whether or not there is the 
11 substantial likelihood the applicant will prevail on the merits 
12 is one I have considered. I have read the amended complaint, 
13 I the original complaint. I have looked over the affidavitsw 
14 I et cetera, and I have listened carefully to arguments from 
15 I both sides. It is my perception that there is a substantial 
16 likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the merits. 
17 J Again, this Court finds that the statute or ordinance 
18 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad on its face. In 
19 fact, it appears to be consistent with other ordinances in the 
20 I State of Utah in other communities that have never been taken 
21 J up on appeal, never been tested, I suppose you could say, and 
22 that have been found therefore to be acceptable to people 
23 operating these businesses. 
24 I A sexually oriented business is one that holds itself 
25 I out as an adult business. I think in this case that probably 
~5
~ 
1 has occurred, or does exist in the sense that when you have 
2 an individual posted at the door, which is what the defense 
3 has so advised, taking the identification, checking for age, 
4 monitoring who comes in and goes out, where you have in a 
5 manner partitioned off that part of the business where sexually 
6 oriented products are sold, it becomes clear chat the business 
7 1 holds itself out differently. 
8 While the name in and of itself does not suggest 
9 that: itrs a sexually oriented business, I think a total 
10 I consideration of the premises and the manner in which the 
11 I business is operated makes that clear. 
12 Additionally, the language of the statute is in the 
13 alternative. It holds itself out as an adult or sexually 
14 J oriented business, or has sexually oriented products as a 
15 principal part of the business' purpose. 
16 We have discussed that throughout oral argument, 
17 I where Counsel has been good enough to allow me to engage in 
18 I a dialogue with them, and it appears clear to me that one of 
19 I the principal purposes, of this business is to sell sexually 
20 I oriented material. The amount of material alluded to in the 
21 I most recent affidavit — I can't remember the name — 
22 I MR. BUCKNER: This is Ms. Segal, your Honor. 
23 I THE COURT: Segal, thank you — makes it clear that 
24 there is a tremendous amount of product on the shelves. In 
25 I fact, it's increased. I think 50 different kinds of dildos and 
MD3V01512 
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all kinds of materials, and the character/ quality, quantity, 
and nature of the same is sexually oriented, and you do not put 
up a special partition, which costs money, and separates a 
certain part of the store. You do not hire a special employee 
to stand at the gates, as it were, and say XNyay" or NSnay" to 
people wishing to enter, if you don't have a strong interest, 
and if in fact one of the principal business purposes is not to 
display and sell sexually oriented material. 
So this Court finds that for the purposes of today's 
hearing in granting the temporary restraining order, that one 
of the principal business purposes — and its doesn't require 
that it be the sole or the main business purpose, but just one 
of the principal purposes — is the sale of sexually oriented 
material. 
I think it's important to understand that there 
does not, in this Court's opinion, appear to exist on "the 
plaintiff's part, or this Court's part for that matter, a 
desire to stop the defendant or other persons with similar 
businesses from operating the business- Rather there is, as 
the ordinance points out, just a requirement that the business 
is property licensed and properly run. 
So minors and unsuspecting adult, and people who have 
no interest in coming across these materials don't have to see 
them, and have reasonable notice that it's there, and the 




1 I Initially the business was operating, and this Court 
2 so finds, that these materials with a small amount on the 
3 shelves had no license, and the Court so found- They then 
4 obtained a license after removing all of the sexually oriented 
5 I materials, pursuant to a stipulation, 
6 Immediately,- or fairly quickly after — I don't 
7 J remember the exact time frame — agreeing to the conditions, 
8 j the business license, they pur. the sexually oriented items 
9 back on the shelves without ever obtaining a sexually oriented 
10 business license, and the Court has considered that as well. 
11 The language, as Mr. Stirba has pointed out, of the 
12 J ordinance at issue. It is not vague, in this Court's opinion, 
13 nor is in overbroad. I think Mr, Stirba's choice of words is 
14 accurate. The language allows some flexibility, but it also 
15 1 has a clarity and a certainty and an understandability. Anyone 
16 looking at it, any person of common ordinary intelligence could 
17 and would understand what the ordinance says, and so would 
18 I therefore be on notice. 
19 I Therefore, based upon the totality for today's 
20 | purposes, I believe that a record ha$ been made, showing that 
21 I the ordinance that's in place now, and has been modified to 
22 sonva extent, was put into effect for a legitimate reason, 
23 I exists based upon a legitimate basis, and that that legitimate 
24 I basis was considered and in place at the time the ordinance was 
25 passed, and the government interest in acting appropriately i$ 
MIDV01514 
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set fourth in the purpose section and in other parts of the 
ordinance as it originally existed and as modified on August 
16th of 2000. 
Mr, Stirba, I'm going to ask you or Mr. Beesley to 
prepare these findings, based upon my ruling, and an order* 
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